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ARTICLES
FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR ACTIVIST
SHAREHOLDERS
Iman Anabtawi* & Lynn Stout**
Corporate law and scholarship generally assume that professional
managers control public corporations,while shareholdersplay only a weak and
passive role. As a result, corporate officers and directors are understood to be
subject to extensive fiduciary duties, while shareholders traditionallyhave been
thought to have far more limited obligations. Outside the contexts of controlling
shareholders and closely held firms, many experts argue shareholdershave no
duties at all.
The most important trend in corporate governance today, however, is the
move toward "shareholder democracy." Changes in financial markets, in
business practice, and in corporate law have given minority shareholders in
public companies greater power than they have ever enjoyed before. Activist
investors, especially rapidly growing hedge funds, are using this new power to
pressure managers into pursuing corporate transactions ranging from share
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repurchases, to special dividends, to the sale of assets or even the entirefirm. In
many cases these transactionsuniquely benefit the activist whilefailing to benefit,
or even harming,the firm and other shareholders.
This Article argues that greatershareholderpower should be coupled with
greater shareholder responsibility. In particular, it argues that the rules of
fiduciary duty traditionallyapplied to officers and directors and, more rarely, to
controlling shareholdersshould be applied to activist minority investors as well.
This proposalmay seem a radicalexpansion offiduciary doctrine. Nonetheless,
the foundations of an expanded shareholderduty have been laid in existing case
law. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that newly empowered activist
shareholders are vulnerable to the same forces of greed and self-interest widely
understood to face corporate officers and directors. Corporate law can, and
should, adapt to this reality.
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INTRODUCTION

In the typical American public corporation, power is dispersed among three
key groups: shareholders, the board of directors, and the company's executive
officers, including its Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Each group has rights
and privileges. Each also has duties and responsibilities.
Contemporary corporate case law and scholarship, however, pay far more
attention to corporate officers' and directors' duties than to shareholders'.
Officers and directors are understood to owe fiduciary duties that are broad and
deep, constraining their every material business decision.' Shareholders are
thought to have far more limited obligations. In fact, outside the narrow

contexts of closely held companies and self-dealing by majority shareholders,
many commentators assume shareholders have no duties at all. 2 Minority
stockholders in public companies are often viewed as free agents, at liberty to
try to influence corporate policy as they see fit-including trying to influence
corporate policy in ways that favor their own interests over those of the
corporation and other shareholders.
The risk that minority shareholders in public firms might use their power in
self-serving ways has understandably attracted little attention for two reasons.
First, until recently, minority shareholders have played a largely passive role in
public companies. This passivity has been driven by both economic and legal
forces. From an economic perspective, the cost of trying to influence corporate
policy has typically outweighed the likely impact of such effort on the value of
any single shareholder's interest, leaving dispersed shareholders in public
companies "rationally apathetic."' 3 From a legal perspective, traditional

1. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-262 (1986) (describing at length
duties of officers and directors). See generally infra notes 11-25 (describing broad fiduciary
duties of executives and directors).
2. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL. CORPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 36 (6th ed.
2007) ("Although directors owe fiduciary duties, shareholders generally do not."); CLARK,
supra note 1, at 141 ("Directors, officers, and, in some situations, controlling shareholders
owe.., a fiduciary duty of loyalty."); 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, THE FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5713 (rev. ed. 2000) ("A shareholder

occupies a position and owes a duty radically different from a director.... [A] shareholder
may vote with the view merely of his or her own self-interest. Ordinarily, unless the
shareholder is a majority shareholder or active in the management of the corporation, he has
no well-defined duties."); David A. Hoffman, The "Duty" to Be a Rational Shareholder,90
MINN. L. REV. 537, 537 (2006) ("American public shareholders are uniquely blessed by the
freedom to do what they will.. . . [S]hareholders owe the corporation no legal duties.");
Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional
Investors?, 60 Bus. LAW. 1, 2 (2004) ("Shareholders do not generally owe any duties to one
another or the corporation[] .... ").See generally infra notes 41-59 (describing how
shareholder duties are conventionally viewed as limited to controlling shareholders,
primarily in freeze-out and close corporation contexts).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 34-36.
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corporate law rules have done little to overcome this hurdle. 4 The result has
been that minority shareholders in public firms have been perceived as having
far less power to set corporate policy than directors and officers have.
The second reason why the question of minority shareholders' duties has
been largely overlooked is that, even when minority shareholders do try to take
an active role in public companies, it has been generally believed that their
primary goal is to improve the firm's overall economic performance-an
interest that is closely aligned with both the interests of the firm and the
interests of other shareholders. Shareholder
activism, accordingly, has been
5
assumed to be a beneficial influence.
In this Article, we argue that both of the foregoing assumptions are
becoming increasingly inaccurate. The economic and legal context in which
American public corporations do business is changing swiftly in ways that
create a pressing need to reexamine conventional notions of shareholder duties.
As a result of recent developments in financial markets, business practices, and
corporate law, minority shareholders are finding it economically rational to try
to influence corporate decision-making. The long-standing assumption that
public company shareholders lack the ability or incentive to engage in activism
is no longer accurate. Meanwhile, even as shareholders are becoming more
powerful, their interests are becoming more heterogeneous. Increasingly, the
economic interests of one shareholder or shareholder group conflict with the
economic interests of others. The result is that activist shareholders are using
their growing influence not to improve overall firm performance, as has
generally been assumed, but to profit at other shareholders' expense.
Consider the following three scenarios, each of which involves an activist
shareholder seeking to advance its own interests to the exclusion or detriment
of other shareholders' interests:
1. A large, publicly held corporation owns and runs a national chain of
grocery stores. The chain becomes embroiled in bitter contract negotiations
with its employees' union over proposed cuts in employee pay and benefits.
The union publicly blames the dispute on the hard-line negotiating stance of the
grocery chain's CEO. The employees' union runs a pension fund for its
members. The union pension fund portfolio includes significant holdings of
common stock in the grocery store chain. Using its status as a shareholder in
the company, the pension fund mounts an aggressive proxy campaign to
remove the company's CEO.
2. A hedge fund owns a large block of common stock in a troubled biotech
company. To raise the stock's share price, the hedge fund urges the biotech
company's management to put the company up for sale, but finding a buyer
willing to pay a premium for the company's shares proves difficult. Finally, a
large health sciences corporation expresses interest in acquiring the biotech
4. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
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firm. Industry analysts voice doubts about the acquisition, believing the price
too high. At this point, the hedge fund buys 10% of the common stock of the
possible acquirer. The hedge fund keeps formal title to the stock, along with its
legal status as a shareholder in the acquirer and the right to vote 10% of the
acquirer's common shares. However, the hedge fund enters into a derivatives
contract with an investment bank to hedge away its economic interest in the
acquiring corporation. If the acquirer's stock price declines, the investment
bank, and not the hedge fund, will bear the loss. The hedge fund then
approaches the acquirer's board and informs the board that if any of its
members oppose buying the biotech company, the hedge fund will use its
shareholder status to mount a proxy battle to remove that director from the
board.
3. A small environmental services company raises $10 million in new
capital from a private investment partnership. In return, the investment
partnership gets 45% of the environmental services company's common stock
and preferred stock with a $15 million liquidation preference (a right to receive
liquidation proceeds that is senior to that of common stockholders). The
liquidation preference can be triggered by a sale of all the company's assets
approved by a majority of the board and a majority of the common shares. Just
a few weeks later, the investment partnership announces it has found a thirdparty buyer willing to pay $15 million for all the environmental services
company's assets. Because the asset sale would trigger the $15 million
preferred stock liquidation preference, the company's common stock would
become worthless. Thanks to its preferred stock interest, however, the
investment partnership would make a quick 50% profit on its initial $10 million
investment. The board of directors of the environmental services company, a
majority of whom are investors in the investment partnership, quickly approves
the asset sale. Because the investment partnership already owns 45% of the
company's common shares, the sale will go forward if 5% or more of the firm's
other common shares are voted in favor of the deal. The investment partnership
approaches several other shareholders of the environmental services company
who collectively own 6% of the company's common stock and offers them the
opportunity to participate in unrelated business deals on highly favorable terms
if they agree to vote their shares in favor of the asset sale. The asset acquisition
is approved.
These scenarios are stylized variations of actual cases reported in judicial
opinions or the business press. 6 They illustrate how minority shareholders in
public companies can and do use their growing influence to push for corporate
actions that serve their personal economic interests. It is unclear whether and to
what extent the traditional rules of shareholder fiduciary duty reach such self6. See infra text accompanying notes 118-21 (describing CalPERS proxy campaign at
Safeway), 127-30 (describing Perry Capital's actions with regard to the proposed Mylan
Laboratories-King Pharamaceuticals merger), 135-39 (discussing DiLillo v. Ustman Techs.,
Inc., No. B148198, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1527 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2001)).
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serving behavior. This lack of clarity has encouraged activist shareholders,
especially hedge funds, to "push the envelope" in employing activist tactics to
pressure corporate officers and boards into pursuing business policies that
uniquely benefit the activist, while failing to help-or even harming-the firm
and its other shareholders.
We believe that fiduciary duty doctrine can and should be interpreted in a
way that takes into account changes in the corporate landscape and reaches
such opportunistic behavior. Indeed, we believe that the law of fiduciary duty is
uniquely suited to address the growing problem that opportunistic shareholder
activism poses for corporate governance. To this end, we propose concrete
recommendations for furthering this doctrinal evolution.
Our approach has two advantages as a strategy for dealing with selfserving shareholder activists. First, it brings existing fiduciary duty doctrine
into line with the changing reality of how and why shareholders assert power in
the corporate governance arena. As a result, it offers a broad, flexible, and
preemptive solution to the problem of shareholder overreaching. This seems
likely to be a far more effective approach than the sorts of ad hoc, after-the-fact
responses to particular forms of abusive shareholder behavior that regulators
have adopted in7 the past and that prominent corporate law scholars continue to
propose today.
Second, we believe our reinterpretation of shareholder fiduciary duty can
lend much-needed support to the controversial but increasingly influential
normative claim that promoting "shareholder democracy" is a useful way to
constrain managerial misbehavior. 8 In the wake of recent corporate scandals,
firms and regulators have urged the adoption of a variety of changes in
corporate law and practice designed to increase shareholders' power to pressure
the directors of publicly held firms into adopting particular business policies,
from requiring more independent directors, to de-staggering corporate boards,
to requiring shareholder votes on CEO pay.9 Academics and investor interest
groups are calling for even more "shareholder empowerment. ' 0 Whether or
not the modem trend of shifting corporate power toward shareholders and away
from boards and executives will ultimately serve shareholders' own interests

7. See infra text accompanying notes 158-63.
8. Professor Lucian Bebchuck is the leading contemporary proponent of shareholder
democracy. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,
118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case for IncreasingShareholder
Power]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675
(2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise].
9. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 8
(arguing for the adoption of a regime with more shareholder control). See generally infra
text accompanying notes 99-107.
10. The issue of shareholder power has attracted such attention that it has been the
subject of not one but two recent symposia in leading law reviews. See Essays, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675 (2007) (containing six essays on the myth of the shareholder franchise); Responses
to IncreasingShareholderPower, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1735 (2006).
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depends critically on how individual shareholders and shareholder groups
actually exercise their growing influence. By limiting their ability to use it in
opportunistic and self-serving ways, we hope to encourage a version of
shareholder democracy that promotes, rather than destroys, shareholder value.
Part I begins by briefly surveying contemporary corporate law rules of
fiduciary duty, focusing especially on the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty is
usually applied to corporate officers and directors, where it is interpreted as a
presumption that any "interested" transaction-that is, any corporate
transaction that provides a material personal economic benefit to the officer or
director-is a potential basis for personal liability unless the officer or director
can demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that the transaction, though tainted
by self-interest, was nevertheless intrinsically fair to the corporation. In some
cases, courts impose a similar fiduciary duty of loyalty on shareholders.
However, courts impose those duties only on "controlling" shareholders,
meaning shareholders who enjoy the ability to control the company's board of
directors. Moreover, the vast majority of cases in which shareholder fiduciary
duties have been applied involve either freeze-out transactions or closely held
corporations. This pattern of very limited application of shareholder fiduciary
duties is grounded in the assumptions that (1) minority shareholders in public
firms are relatively powerless, and (2) minority shareholders share a strong
common interest in improving corporate performance that reduces the risk of
opportunistic behavior.
Part II discusses why both assumptions are becoming increasingly
inaccurate. In recent decades, a number of important developments-including
increased institutional investing, changes in federal proxy law, the creation of
shareholder advisory services, the rise of activist hedge funds, and financial
innovations that can magnify activists' voting power-have worked together to
significantly shift the balance of power in public firms away from executives
and boards and toward activist shareholders. The trend seems likely only to
continue as would-be reformers push to increase shareholder power further.
Meanwhile, as shareholders are becoming more powerful, they are also
becoming more heterogeneous. Activist shareholders can have serious conflicts
of interest with other shareholders arising from their other relationships with
the firm, from their investments in derivatives or securities issued by other
corporations, from their investments in other parts of the firm's capital
structure, and from their short-term investment focus. Taken together, the two
trends of shareholders becoming both more powerful and more divided point to
an inevitable increase in the risk of shareholder opportunism.
Part III explores how American corporate law can address this increased
risk through the relatively straightforward mechanism of applying corporate
fiduciary duties to shareholders more broadly. In particular, activist shareholder
overreaching can be deterred by interpreting loyalty duties to apply not only to
controlling shareholders, who can dictate board decisions in all matters, but
also to activist minorities who succeed in influencing management with respect
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to a single transaction or business decision. Moreover, shareholder fiduciary
duties should be applied not only in the traditional contexts of freeze-outs and
closely held corporations but also in any factual situation where a shareholder
reaps a unique personal economic benefit to the detriment or exclusion of other
shareholders. On first inspection, our proposal may seem a radical expansion of
existing law. We show, however, that the scope of these admittedly expanded
shareholder duties can be kept within reasonable bounds by allowing
shareholders, like officers and directors, to rely on standard loyalty defenses,
including the defense that their conflict of interest was not material or that the
challenged transaction was intrinsically fair.
Part IV addresses several potential objections to our proposal, including the
objections that it will foster excessive litigation, that it will chill beneficial
shareholder activism, and that fiduciary duties for activist shareholders are
unnecessary, as any attempt by activists to use their influence for personal gain
will be checked by the principle of majority rule. Part IV demonstrates that
none of these objections is persuasive.
We conclude by pointing out there is no reason to assume that activist
shareholders are somehow impervious to the same temptations of greed and
self-interest that are widely understood to face corporate officers and directors.
Our proposed reinterpretation of shareholder fiduciary duties recognizes this
reality.
I.

FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER FIDUCIARY DUTIES

A. CorporateFiduciaryDuties

One of the most basic concepts in corporate law is that of fiduciary duties.
With modest variations, these duties fall into two broad categories: the duty of
loyalty and the duty of care.11 Both duties are usually discussed in the public
company context as they apply to "managers" (that is, executive officers and
corporate directors). We thus begin our discussion by surveying briefly how
corporate fiduciary duties of loyalty and care are interpreted in this context.
In theory, corporate officers and directors owe the corporation and its
shareholders a duty of care, meaning a duty not to act negligently. In practice,
this duty has been modified (some might say extinguished) by the doctrine
known as the "business judgment rule." The business judgment rule is usually
described as a legal presumption that the directors and officers of the
corporation have exercised due care by acting on an informed basis, in good
faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the best interests of the
corporation. 12 Unless a plaintiff can produce persuasive evidence rebutting one
11. See generally CLARK, supra note 1, at 126-36, 141-57 (discussing duties).
12. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See generally Lynn A. Stout, In
Praise of Procedure:An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and
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of these three elements, corporate directors and officers are effectively
insulated from liability for breach of the duty of care.
It is very difficult for a plaintiff to establish, as a practical matter, that
corporate managers who made even a token effort to perform their jobs were
not "informed," especially in the face of case law suggesting that only a
showing of gross negligence will make the case. 13 It is also difficult for a
plaintiff to demonstrate convincingly that an executive or director who does not
have a conflict of interest (which would raise loyalty issues) was nevertheless
acting in "bad faith" or on the belief her decision would harm the corporation.
For these and other reasons, 14 the duty of care offers notoriously weak
protection against negligence by corporate officers and directors.
In contrast, the fiduciary duty of loyalty has teeth and provides the
principal legal constraint against managerial misbehavior-and, we argue
below in Part III.B, against shareholder misbehavior as well. As a result, it is
the duty of loyalty that receives the lion's share of our attention. Unlike the
duty of care, which applies even to well-intentioned decisions, the duty of
loyalty focuses on motive.1 5 Theorists have conceived of the nature of the duty
in various ways, sometimes sounding in trust theory and other times in agency
theory. 16 At its core, however, the duty of loyalty requires a corporate fiduciary
(in this case, an officer or director) to act only in the best interests of the
fiduciary's beneficiary (in this case, the firm and its shareholders). 17 In other
words, the duty of loyalty asks managers to place the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders above their own interests.
Given the human instinct for pursuing self-interest, 1 8 this is a tall order.
How does loyalty doctrine attempt to fill it? Most obviously, corporate law
discourages loyalty violations by adopting a modified version of the strict
prophylactic prohibition, drawn from trust and agency law, known as the
"exclusive benefit" rule. The exclusive benefit rule rests on the notion that if
we want to ensure fiduciaries act only in their beneficiaries' interests, the first
thing we must do is eliminate any possibility that fiduciaries can act in their
own interests. This can be done by flatly forbidding fiduciaries from using their
power over a beneficiary's assets in any way that might bring a fiduciary
personal gain. Even though such "self-dealing" transactions might in some
the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 675 (2002) (discussing the business

judgment rule).
13. See Stout, supra note 12, at 680 & n.19.
14. See id. at 680 & n.18. For example, indemnification, insurance, and exculpation
reduce the risk to managers of personal liability for any breaches of the duty of care.
15. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
16. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of FiduciaryDuty in Close Corporations, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1675 (1990).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, On the ProperMotives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why

You Don't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9,
16-20 (2003) (discussing the role of self-interest in corporate theory and practice).
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cases benefit both parties, they are strictly prohibited.
The justification for this traditional prohibition is twofold. First, absent
such a strict rule, it is feared fiduciaries inevitably will be tempted to use their
positions to benefit themselves at their beneficiaries' expense. Second, given
the complex and ongoing nature of the fiduciary relationship, it is often not
feasible to protect beneficiaries against this sort of opportunistic behavior
through explicit contracts or careful monitoring. 19 Thus, the benefits of a strict
prophylactic prohibition, according to the logic of the exclusive benefit rule,
outweigh the costs.
Corporate law takes a much more relaxed view of the exclusive benefit
principle than does the common law of trust and agency. In particular, it does
not prohibit corporate fiduciaries from dealing with their firms or their
shareholders. Rather, corporate law modifies the strict rule against self-dealing
by allowing corporate officers and directors to use their corporate powers to
pursue business transactions that benefit themselves as long as they are
prepared to prove to a disinterested party-in particular, to a court-that the
transaction, although self-interested, was nevertheless intrinsically "fair" to the
corporation. 20 Thus, a corporate officer or director can be found liable for
breach of the duty of loyalty only if (1) she uses her corporate office to promote
a corporate transaction that provides her with material personal benefits and (2)
the transaction is "unfair." It is not fiduciary self-dealing alone that is improper.
Instead, it is unfair fiduciary self-dealing that is improper.
Procedurally, a plaintiff who seeks to hold a corporate officer or director
liable for breach of the duty of loyalty has the initial burden of alleging that the
contested transaction was tainted by self-interest. To do this, courts have
generally held the plaintiff must show the officer or director stood to reap a
material economic benefit from the transaction. 2 1 Once the plaintiff has shown
the possibility of self-interest, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate
the intrinsic fairness of the transaction to the company. 22 In analyzing intrinsic
fairness, courts consider both the terms of the transaction ("fair price") and the
fairness of the bargaining process leading up to it ("fair dealing").2 3
Here again, corporate law adds some important bells and whistles to
traditional fiduciary duty doctrine. For example, the Delaware corporate code
provides for two procedures that courts have deemed are so significant that, if
officers and directors follow them properly, they shift the legal burden of
demonstrating unfairness back to the plaintiff. In particular, a corporate officer
or director can shift the burden of demonstrating unfairness by showing that the
19. CLARK, supra note 1, at 141.
20. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991), quoted in Cinerama, Inc. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1170 (Del. 1995).
21. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983); DENNIs J. BLOCK,
NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BusNEss JUDGMENT RULE 283-88 (1998).

22. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
23. Seeid at711.
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transaction in question, although admittedly self-interested, was nevertheless
approved after full disclosure by either (1) a majority of the company's
disinterested directors or (2) by a majority of the company's disinterested
shareholders. If either showing is made, the burden of demonstrating unfairness
24

reverts to the plaintiff.
While corporate law's loyalty rules are more flexible than their traditional
counterparts under the laws of trust and agency, 2 5 they share the same
prophylactic character. Corporate officers and directors can engage in selfinterested transactions, but only subject to the judicial test of fairness. And
while defendants can shift the burden of showing unfairness onto the plaintiff
by demonstrating that the conflicted transaction was disclosed to and approved
by either the corporation's disinterested directors or its disinterested
shareholders, fairness remains the judicial touchstone in corporate law loyalty
cases.
B. FiduciaryDuties of Shareholders
As noted above, fiduciary duties are usually applied to officers and
directors. In some cases, however, courts impose fiduciary duties of loyalty on
certain types of shareholders as well. When they do, the analysis tends to
follow the application of loyalty duties in officer and director cases. In
particular, courts have held that majority shareholders, like corporate officers
and directors, owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to minority shareholders that
precludes them from using their positions as controlling shareholders to extract
material economic benefits from the firm at the minority's expense. 26 As
articulated by the California Supreme Court in the case of Jones v. H.F.

24. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2005). When there is disinterested director or
disinterested shareholder approval, most case law suggests that the defendant may not be
immunized from a loyalty claim. Instead, the burden of proving the substantive unfairness of
the transaction may simply shift back to the plaintiff. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703; In re
Wheelabrator Techs. Inc. S'holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995). Nevertheless,
there is some authority suggesting that, in certain circumstances, disinterested director or
disinterested shareholder approval can effectively insulate a defendant from loyalty claims.
See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 334 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing the question).
25. Victor Brudney, Contract and FiduciaryDuty in CorporateLaw, 38 B.C. L. REV.
595, 599 n.12 (1977).
26. See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471-72 (Cal. 1969); Kahn v.
Lynch Commc'ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
In some circumstances, shareholders have been held to have a duty of care as well. In
particular, a few cases have held that a controlling shareholder may breach its duty of care if
it knowingly sells control of the corporations to a "looter" (that is, a controlling shareholder
that plans to breach its duty of loyalty and expropriate corporate assets for itself). Swinney v.
Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973); Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., 901 A.2d
751, 762 (Del. Ch. 2006).
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Ahmanson & Co., 2 7 "Majority shareholders may not use their power to control
corporate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner detrimental to
the minority. Any use to which they put the corporation or their power
to
28
control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately ....
Consider, for example, an individual who owns 51% of a company's
common stock and so can dictate who sits on the company's board of directors.
Such a majority shareholder might be tempted to use his power over the board
to push through a corporate transaction that provides a unique profit
opportunity for him while harming minority shareholders. The classic example
is a "freeze-out" merger in which the minority shareholders are forced to sell
their shares, at an unfairly low price, to an entity that is wholly owned by the
controlling shareholder. As in the case of interested transactions by corporate
officers and directors, courts deem freeze-outs orchestrated by controlling
shareholders to be interested transactions and potential violations of controlling
shareholders' duties of loyalty. As in the case of corporate officers and
directors, such interested transactions are not utterly prohibited. A controlling
shareholder can escape liability by proving, to the court's satisfaction, that
while the transaction was tainted by a conflict of interest, it was nevertheless
intrinsically fair to the firm and other shareholders.
Also, as in the case of officers and directors, courts assessing the fairness
of controlling shareholders' transactions initially put the burden on the
controlling shareholder to establish the intrinsic fairness of the deal to the
corporation and its minority investors. In addition, the concept of intrinsic
fairness similarly encompasses both substantively fair terms and fair bargaining
procedures. 29 Thus, to prove that an interested transaction was nevertheless
entirely fair to the corporation and its minority shareholders, a controlling
shareholder must prove to the court's satisfaction that the transaction30took place
at a "fair price" and that it was accomplished through "fair dealing."
Finally, as with officers and directors, courts have found that some
bargaining procedures contribute so substantially to a finding of intrinsic
fairness that, if those procedures are followed, the court will shift the burden
back to the plaintiff to prove that the transaction, despite the fairness of the
procedures surrounding it, involved substantively unfair terms. This is
particularly clear in controlling shareholder cases where a suspect transaction,
after full disclosure, was approved by "a majority of the minority," meaning a
majority of the minority shareholders who did not have a conflict of interest.
The effect of approval by a majority of the company's "disinterested"
directors is more uncertain, as some courts have shown a justifiable reluctance
27. 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969).

28. Id.at 471.
29. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115; Weinberger, 457 A.2d 711.
30. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (holding that fair dealing "embraces questions of
when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to
directors and how the approvals of the directors and shareholders were obtained").
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to assume that any director can truly be "independent" of a controlling
shareholder with the power to remove her from the board. Nevertheless, certain
Delaware case law suggests that if a transaction involving a controlling
shareholder is approved by a special board committee comprised of
disinterested directors with "real bargaining power" that deals with the majority
shareholder "at31arms length," this shifts the burden of showing unfairness back
to the plaintiff.
C. Limits of ShareholderDuties

It thus appears that, at least in certain cases, courts subject shareholders to
loyalty duties similar in nature to the loyalty duties imposed on corporate
officers and directors. Nevertheless, most contemporary discussions of
fiduciary duty in public corporations continue to orbit around officers and
directors. Modem corporate casebooks, for example, typically emphasize that
shareholders have
"rights," while officers and directors have "duties" and
"obligations." 32 Similarly, while the Delaware General Corporation Law
contains a specific provision addressing director and officer liability for conflict
of interest transactions, it includes no provision directly addressing shareholder
liability for
breach of fiduciary duty, instead leaving the question entirely to
33
case law.

Why do shareholders' duties receive so little attention? The puzzle can be
explained in part by the fact that shareholders in public corporations
historically have been passive investors, not active participants in corporate
governance. This passivity stemmed not only from the "public good" nature of
shareholder activism (a minority shareholder who seeks to improve corporate
performance must bear all the costs of the activism while sharing any resulting
benefits with all the firm's other shareholders) 34 but also from traditional
corporate law rules of proxy voting which made it difficult and expensive for

31. Id. at 709 n.7.
32. See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 183, 327 (2d ed.

2003) (containing chapters titled "Directors' and Officers' Duties of Care and Loyalty" and
"Rights and Powers of Shareholders: Inspection rights, Voting, and Proxies"); FOUNDATIONS
OF CORPORATE LAW 148, 187, 258 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993) (containing chapters titled
"Boards of Directors and Fiduciary Duties," "Management's Fiduciary Duty and Takeover
Defenses," and "Shareholder Voting Rights and the Exercise of Voice").
33. See supra note 24.
34. See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 76 (1932) ("[T]he normal apathy of the small stockholder is such that he
will either fail to return his proxy vote, or will sign on the dotted line, returning his proxy to
the [management] of the corporation."). See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1982); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971). The resulting
disincentive to act is compounded by the free-rider problem that any one shareholder may
decide to save itself the cost of acting in the belief that another shareholder will do so. See
CLARK, supra note 1, at 392-93 (discussing the free-rider problem).
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shareholders to attempt to exercise meaningful corporate power.35 To the
extent that shareholders in public corporations were unable, as a practical
matter, to influence corporate policy, one can understand why the question of
shareholder fiduciary duties has been neglected. As one commentator has put it,
"There is no need for concern about the oppressive propensities of persons who
36
lack the power of implementation."
A second reason why shareholder duties have not attracted much attention
is the common belief that, even in the rare case when a minority shareholder
tries to take an active role in corporate decision-making, that activism benefits
both the corporation and other shareholders. 37 According to this view, minority
shareholders want to make the corporation as profitable as possible in order to
maximize the value of their shares. To the extent they accomplish this
objective, they serve not only their own interests but those of the other
shareholders as well. In other words, shareholder interests are "similar if not
identical, '38 so that for the vast majority of business decisions the self-interest
of any single shareholder coincides with the interests of all shareholders. 39 This
theory of uniform shareholder interest independently renders fiduciary limits on
shareholder action unnecessary.
Taken together, the assumption that shareholders in public firms are mostly
passive, and the belief that shareholders have common interests, have led many
observers to conclude that shareholders, unlike corporate officers or directors,
are not generally bound by fiduciary duties. 40 Instead, shareholder duties are
thought to arise only for limited types of shareholders, and only in limited types
of circumstances.
35. In particular, where corporate law allows incumbent directors to use corporate
funds to solicit proxies for their own re-election, dissident shareholders must generally use
their own funds to wage a proxy battle to oust incumbents. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note
34, at 76 ("[T]he cost of mobilizing the votes of tens or hundreds of thousands of
stockholdings by circularizing them and perhaps conducting a publicity campaign, must be
such as to prevent any but the most wealthy from seeking this method of seizing control
[over the corporation] ....

This is especially the case where the existing control [group] can

charge to the corporation the costs of its fight to maintain its position, while the outsider
must conduct a fights at his own private expense."). See generally infra text accompanying
notes 67, 74-78 (describing how proxy rules disfavor dissidents). Other legal rules can also
discourage shareholder activism. See generally Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 522 (1990).
36. J.A.C. Hetherington, The Minority's Duty of Loyalty in Close Corporations, 1972
DUKE L.J. 921, 933.
37. See Hetherington, supra note 36, at 934; Earl Sneed, The Stockholder May Vote As
He Pleases: Theory and Fact, 22 U. Prrr. L. REv. 23, 24 (1960).
38. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 405 (1983). See generally Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REv. 561, 564 (2006) (arguing that shareholder power

advocates "regard shareholders as a monolith with a single, overriding objectivemaximizing shareholder value").

39. Hetherington, supra note 36, at 934.
40. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 2, 32.
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Existing law on shareholder fiduciary duties can be interpreted as limiting
shareholder duties in at least two important ways. First, cases often seem to
suggest that only "controlling" shareholders are subject to the duty of loyalty,
while "non-controlling" shareholders may vote as they please without objection
that their motives are for personal gain. 4 1 Second, courts have tended to find
even controlling shareholders subject to fiduciary duties primarily in two
limited business situations: corporate "freeze-outs" and closely held
corporations.
1. Controllingshareholders

Let us begin with the idea that shareholder duties apply only to
"controlling" shareholders. Contemporary discussions often implicitly assume
that the only shareholders who owe any fiduciary duties are "controlling"
shareholders; that is, shareholders in a position to dictate to the corporation's'
42
business decisions and particularly the membership of its board of directors.
Indeed, the degree to which a shareholder controls the board has become the
judicial touchstone of shareholder fiduciary duty.
In particular, because shareholders generally elect and remove directors by
majority vote, 43 a shareholder who owns more than 50% of the company's
44
outstanding shares has become the archetypal "controlling" shareholder.
Shareholders who own less than a majority are not, without more, controlling
shareholders. They can be deemed controlling only if a court finds they exert
"actual control" over the corporation. 4 5 This idea is reflected in a number of
cases where courts have rejected the argument that a shareholder of a public
company who does not hold more than 50% of the firm's shares should
automatically be subject to fiduciary duties. Instead, when a shareholder has a
less than majority stake, courts tend to engage in cautious, detailed factual
analysis of whether that particular shareholder, individually or together with
associates, owns enough shares to give the shareholder clear voting power to
replace the board of directors.
An illustrative case is In re Cysive, Inc. ShareholdersLitigation,4 6 in which
Nelson Carbonell owned approximately 35% of Cysive, Inc., a publicly traded
company. When associates' holdings and options to purchase additional stock
were taken into account, Carbonell controlled as much as 40% of Cysive's
41. Sneed, supra note 37, at 23; see, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845
(Del. 1987); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. 1984); Weinstein Enterprises
Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 507 (Del. Ch. 2005).
42. See sources cited supra note 2.
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 141(k) (2005).
44. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
45. Citron, 569 A.2d 53; Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d 1334; Weinstein, 870 A.2d 499.
46. 836 A.2d 531 (Del. 2003).
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voting equity. In deciding whether this made Carbonell the "controlling"
shareholder of Cysive, the Delaware Chancellor focused on Carbonell's ability,
should he became disenchanted with Cysive's directors, to elect a new board
"without having to attract much, if any, support from public stockholders.' 4 7
The Chancellor emphasized that "100% turn-out is unlikely even in a contested
49
election,' 4 8 and that a "40% block is very potent in view of that reality.'
In Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.,50 the Delaware Supreme
Court used a similarly cautious approach in analyzing whether Alcatel, the
minority shareholder alleged to be controlling in that case, "did exercise actual
control over Lynch by dominating its corporate affairs." 51 The Court concluded
that Alcatel, which owned more than 43% of Lynch, "dominated" Lynch
because it was able to substitute its own judgment for that of the Lynch
board. 52 As evidence, the court quoted an Alcatel-nominated director's
admonition to Lynch's other board members: "[Y]ou must listen to us. We are
[sic] 43% owner. You have to do what we tell you." 53 The court looked to such
statements, together with evidence that the board's independent directors voted
with Alcatel's directors, in upholding the lower court's finding that 54Alcatel
exercised actual control over Lynch and dominated its corporate affairs.
Such cases indicate that when a shareholder does not control an absolute
majority of the votes of a corporation, it must exercise power over a de facto
majority to be subject to fiduciary duties. In other words, controlling
shareholder analysis, as currently performed, looks to whether a shareholder or
group of affiliated shareholders owns enough voting shares to allow it to dictate
membership on the board. This approach ignores entirely the possibility that
shareholders with smaller stakes-that is, shareholders who do not have voting
power clearly sufficient to determine who sits on the board of directors-might
still be able to influence corporate officers or directors in less obvious ways
(for example, by threatening a distracting and costly proxy fight or an
embarrassing media relations campaign). It also ignores the power that the
marginal impact of a shareholder's vote can have on the outcome of a corporate
decision. To illustrate, suppose that a corporate action, such as a merger, must
be approved by the vote of an absolute majority of outstanding shares. Suppose
further that investors holding 49% of those shares oppose the merger, while
investors holding another 49% support it. In such a case a 2% shareholder who
provides the "swing vote" controls the outcome. Yet, a 2% shareholder could
not, under traditional analysis, be deemed a "controlling shareholder" with
47. Id.
at 552.
48. Id. at 552 n.30.
49. Id.
50. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
51. Id.at 1115.
52. Id.at 1113-14.

53. Id. at 1114.
54. Id.at 1114-15.
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fiduciary responsibilities, because 2% is not mathematically sufficient to
control the firm or its board more generally.
The conventional approach to shareholder fiduciary duties thus seems to
frame the issue of shareholder control in terms of whether a particular
shareholder has absolute control over all corporate conduct as a routine
matter. The inquiry is not issue-specific. Yet, as we discuss in detail in the next
Part, there are many specific issues as to which modem shareholders often have
sharply divergent interests. A minority activist that focuses all of its attention
on a single matter may be able, especially given other shareholders' rational
apathy, to exercise significant influence over the corporation's actions within
that narrow sphere. If such minority shareholders are excused from fiduciary
duties on the grounds they are not "controlling," they are free to use their
influence, albeit selectively, to serve themselves at other shareholders' expense.
2. Freeze-outs andclosely held corporations
Shareholders in public corporations traditionally have been perceived not
only as being passive but also as having largely homogenous interests. This
belief in the uniformity of shareholders' interests has led both courts and
commentators to tend to think of even controlling shareholders' duties as
arising primarily in two limited factual contexts: freeze-out transactions and
closely held corporations.
We first consider freeze-out cases. The term "freeze-out" refers to a
transaction in which a controlling shareholder uses its influence to cause the
corporation to pursue an action that results in the controlling shareholder's
owning the corporation in its entirety, while minority shareholders are forced to
sell their shares for cash or other securities. 55 In effect, freeze-outs force non56
controlling shareholders to sell their equity to the controlling shareholder.
Freeze-outs present an obvious danger to minority shareholders because the
controlling shareholder can use its position to effectuate the transaction at an
unfairly low price. As an example, suppose a parent company seeks to acquire
100% of the equity of a partially owned subsidiary in which it holds 60% of the
outstanding shares. In such a case, the parent has an incentive to set the merger
price as low as possible because every $1 reduction in the merger price saves
the controlling shareholder $1 while costing the controlling shareholder only 60
cents. Courts have not hesitated to declare that controlling shareholders owe

55. See generally CLARK, supra note 1, at 499-530 (discussing "freezeouts and
buyouts").
56. A common freeze-out technique is a cash parent-subsidiary merger, in which the
"parent" corporation owns a majority of the outstanding shares of the "sub." The parent
corporation can, by majority rule, cause the sub to merge into the parent (or another whollyowned subsidiary of the parent) in exchange for cash. Upon consummation of the merger,
the minority shareholders have been eliminated as investors in the subsidiary corporation.
See, e.g., Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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loyalty duties to minority shareholders in these circumstances and to subject
freeze-outs to judicial scrutiny under the heightened standard of intrinsic
57
fairness.
The second fact pattern in which courts commonly treat shareholders as
fiduciaries is in closely held corporation cases. Closely held corporations are
characterized by having very few stockholders, substantial stockholder
participation in corporate management, and the absence of a ready public
market for selling their shares. 58 These features make closely held corporations
fertile ground for shareholder fiduciary duty cases for two reasons. First,
because closely held corporations have few shareholders and all or some are
actively involved in running the business, there will often be a shareholder or
group of shareholders that "controls" the corporation's actions. It is not
unusual, for example, for closely held corporation shareholders to also serve as
directors, officers, or key employees (and, accordingly, to rely on their salaries
from the firm as their primary source of income). Second, in closely held
corporations a controlling shareholder can threaten minority interests in a
variety of ways above and beyond conducting a freeze-out. For example, the
controlling shareholder might decide to exclude a minority shareholder from
any salaried position in the firm while simultaneously refusing to declare
dividends, thus cutting off any prospect of a return on the minority
shareholder's investment. Closely held corporations, as a result, provide a
setting in which it is especially likely that shareholder interests will conflict and
that a controlling shareholder will act opportunistically. Without a liquid
market to provide an exit, the position of a minority shareholder in a closely
held corporation can become untenable. Subjecting controlling shareholders of
closely held corporations
to fiduciary duties protects minority investors trapped
59
in such situations.
The prevalence of freeze-out and closely held corporation fact patterns in
the case law on shareholder fiduciary duties is understandable. Freeze-outs and
closely held corporations both present situations where conflicts of interest
among shareholders are common, obvious, and severe. Nevertheless, the fact
that so many cases in which courts have imposed shareholder duties involve
these situations can easily lead to the assumption-a mistaken one, we
believe-that controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties only in the contexts
of freeze-outs and closely held corporations.

57. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115 (Del. 1994) (referring to the parent-subsidiary context
as an instance in which a controlling or dominating shareholder stands on both sides of a
transaction).
58. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975)
(discussing characteristics of close corporations).
59. See id. at 515 (making this point).
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D. Summation
Like corporate officers and directors, shareholders owe fiduciary duties.
Courts, however, recognize shareholder fiduciary duties only for controlling
shareholders, and primarily in freeze-outs and closely held corporation cases.
This is not to say there are no cases in which fiduciary duties have been applied
to non-controlling shareholders or outside the freeze-out and closely held
corporation
contexts. 60 Such applications are noticeably uncommon,
61
however.
It is therefore not surprising that shareholder fiduciary duties are
commonly understood to exist only for controlling shareholders, and even then,
principally in the contexts of freeze-outs and closely held companies. Many
corporate law casebooks reflect this assumption. They treat shareholder
fiduciary duties not as a uniform and general topic, but as a set of separate and
specialized doctrines discussed in discrete sections treating freeze-outs and
closely held corporation law. 62 Indeed, some corporate experts argue that
shareholder fiduciary duties are not really "shareholder" duties at all but instead
a subspecies of director duties that come into play in unusual cases where
shareholders act like "shadow" directors. For example, one leading authority
states that it is only when shareholders become the functional equivalent of
directors that they step into corresponding responsibilities:
Generally shareholders have no rights or obligations relative to the
corporation or the other shareholders save those contained in their stock
contracts. Controlling shareholders, however, have a fiduciary duty to the
minority in all corporations, including publicly held corporations. This duty is
a consequence of the power that controlling shareholders have to direct the
corporation's affairs. Although the traditional corporate model posits that
directors, rather than shareholders, direct corporate activity, this model breaks
down where a single shareholder or group of shareholders owns a controlling
interest. In such situations, the board is usually just a proxy for the controlling
shareholder or.roup. The power incident to control gives rise to equivalent
responsibility.
60. See, e.g., Smith v. At. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); see
also infra text accompanying notes 171-75.
61. See BLOCK, BARTON & RADIN, supra note 21, at 397.
62. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 1, at 761 (discussing shareholder loyalty duties in two
chapters entitled "Close Corporations" and "Control Shifts and Insider Imperialism:
Freezeouts and Buyouts"); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 374, 678 (9th ed. 2005) (discussing shareholder loyalty duties in two
sections entitled "Fiduciary Obligations of Shareholders in Close Corporations" and "Duties
of Controlling Shareholders," the latter focusing on freeze-out cases); CHARLES R.T.
O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

407, 619 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing shareholder loyalty duties primarily in two sections
entitled "Protecting Participants' Expectations in a Closely Held Business" and "Mergers
and Other 'Friendly' Control Transactions," the latter focusing on freeze-out cases).
63. BLOCK, BARTON & RADN, supra note 21, at 368-69 ("Just as interested directors
and officers who stand on both sides of a transaction and who do not obtain disinterested
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Conventional analysis of shareholder fiduciary duties is thus very cautious
in its approach, interpreting shareholder duties narrowly in terms of both the
situations that give rise to those duties, and the types of shareholders who are
subject to them. This is understandable in the context of the assumptions,
discussed in Part I.B.1 above, that shareholders generally lack influence and
share common interests. As we detail in the next Part, however, these
assumptions are increasingly of only historical relevance. Shareholders are
becoming both more powerful and more divided, giving rise to troubling
consequences. Corporate law can and should adapt to these changes.
II. THE EVOLVING ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. The Activist Shareholder
In 1932, renowned corporate scholars Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means
described a phenomenon that has troubled corporate scholars ever since: 64the
"separation of ownership from control" in the American public corporation.
As Berle and Means put it:
Since direction over the activities of a corporation is exercised through the
board of directors, we may say for practical purposes that control [over the
corporation] lies in the hands of the individual or group who have the power to
select the board of directors.
When the largest single [shareholder] interest amounts to but a fraction of one
percent-the case in several of the largest American corporations-no
stockholder is in the position through his holdings alone to place important

director or disinterested shareholder approval bear the burden of demonstrating that the
transaction is fair, so too controlling shareholders who stand on both sides of a transaction
and who do not obtain disinterested director or disinterested shareholder approval ordinarily
must demonstrate that the transaction is fair." (footnotes omitted)).
At least in theory, directors' fiduciary duties could also be implicated when a
controlling shareholder uses its control to cause the firm to enter into a transaction in which
the controlling shareholder has a conflict of interest. One might argue that a director who
allows a controlling shareholder to push through such a transaction has breached the
director's own fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to the minority shareholders. We are unaware,
however, of any case where a court has held that an uninterested director breached his or her
duty by doing a controlling shareholder's bidding. At least two arguments support this result.
First, for a number of well-recognized policy reasons, the business judgment rule generally
protects any director decision that is not tainted by a personal economic conflict of interest
on the part of the director. See Stout, supra note 12, at 681. Second, director liability may not
be necessary, because controlling shareholder liability can act as a substitute: the actions of a
controlling shareholder who engages in a conflict-of-interest-transaction would be held to
the intrinsic fairness standard. Thus, approval by a director who does not have a direct,
personal conflict of interest can be safely reviewed under the deferential business judgment
rule, even though at least in theory the director's judgment might be compromised by the
knowledge that the director might be removed by the controlling shareholder.
64. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 34, at 7.
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pressure upon the management.
Where ownership is sufficiently
sub-divided, the management can thus
65
become self-perpetuating body.

Like many modem experts, Berle and Means traced the origins of
shareholder powerlessness in public companies to two distinct factors, one
economic and one legal. The economic factor was the rational apathy of
dispersed small investors whose individual interests were so small that it did
not make sense for any single one of them, alone, to take an active role in
corporate affairs. 66 The legal factor was corporate law's proxy rules, which
allowed incumbent directors to use corporate funds to solicit shareholder proxy
votes in support of their nominees, while requiring shareholders
wishing to
67
mount a challenge to use their personal funds to solicit proxies.
Each of these two factors, which Berle and Means identified as the causes
of shareholder powerlessness more than three-quarters of a century ago, is still
in effect to at least some extent. But the American corporate landscape has
changed substantially since Berle and Means' time. Changes in markets,
business practice and business institutions, and in corporate and securities law,
have seriously eroded the realism of the standard assumptions that shareholders
are passive and powerless. Below, we survey some of the most important
influences that in recent years have given shareholders in public firms far more
power than they ever enjoyed before.
1. The rise of the institutionalinvestor

When Berle and Means wrote about shareholder powerlessness in 1932,
most shareholders were individuals. This situation has changed dramatically
with the rise of the "institutional investor." Institutional investors-typically
pension funds and mutual funds-aggregate the savings of millions of
individuals into enormous investment portfolios that buy stock in public
companies. As a result, institutional investors can take far larger positions in
particular companies than most individual investors ever could.
Institutions have captured a larger and larger share of the total market for
public equities over time, from 8% of outstanding shares in 1950 to nearly twothirds today.6 8 This trend has been widely recognized as undermining the
realism of the assumption that shareholders in public companies are dispersed
and powerless. 69 As Professor Bernard Black put it in his influential 1990
65. Id. at 66, 78, 82.
66. Id. at 76. See generally supra note 34 (describing rational apathy problem).
67. Id. See generally text accompanying notes 67, 74-78 (describing how proxy rules
disfavor dissidents).
68. BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 509.
69. See generally Anat R. Admati et al., Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing,
and FinancialMarket Equilibrium, 102 J. POL. EcON. 1097 (1994); Bernard S. Black, Agents
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article Shareholder Passivity Reexamined,70 "[C]ollective action problems,
while important, seem manageable for the large institutions who are today the
dominant shareholders." 7 1 "[T]he model of public companies as owned by
thousands of anonymous shareholders simply isn't true.72There are a limited
number of large shareholders, and they know each other."
Institutional investors are in a much more favorable position to play an
activist role in corporate governance than dispersed individual investors are.
Although many pension and mutual funds rely on relatively passive stockpicking strategies, especially when they hold highly diversified portfolios, a
number of prominent institutional investors-including both mutual funds like
Fidelity and Vanguard and pension funds like CalPERS-have emerged as
activist investors willing to mount public relations campaigns, initiate
litigation, and launch proxy battles to pressure 73corporate officers and directors
into following their preferred business strategy.
2. The SEC's 1992 proxy rule amendments

Shareholders' ability to influence policy in public companies received an
important boost in 1992, when the SEC amended its federal proxy regulations
for the express purpose of permitting large shareholders to exercise their voting
power more effectively. 74 Prior to 1992, the SEC had interpreted the phrase
"proxy solicitation" to include any communication "reasonably calculated" to
influence another shareholder's vote. 75 Because participation in a proxy
solicitation triggers burdensome federal disclosure obligations, this
interpretation discouraged investors from communicating with each other over
matters that might be subject to a shareholder vote. The 1992 amendments
eliminated this problem by exempting from the definition of "proxy
solicitation" most shareholder communications not actually accompanied by a

Watching Agents: The Promise of InstitutionalInvestor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992);
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 567 (1990)

[hereinafter Black, ShareholderPassivity].
70. Black, ShareholderPassivity,supra note 69.
71. Id. at 608.
72. Id. at 574. But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, ShareholderActivism and Institutional
Investors 12-17 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 05-20, 2005),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-796227 (advancing the view that institutional
shareholders are rationally apathetic, except for union and state and local pension funds,
which are the institutions most likely to engage in self-dealing).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 118-21 (describing CalPERs proxy campaign at
Safeway).
74. See generally BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 528-29 (describing 1992
amendments and their effects); Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New
Hedge Fund Activism: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 32 J. CoRP. L. 681, 686-89 (2007) (describing
1992 changes).
75. See Briggs, supra note 74, at 686 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(1) (2006)).

HeinOnline -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1276 2007-2008

March 2008]

A CTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS

1277

76

formal proxy solicitation.
The 1992 amendments also made clear that most shareholders were free to
make public statements, including speeches, press releases, newspaper
advertisements, broadcast media, and internet communications. 77 The 1992
amendments thus made it much easier for investors-including institutional
investors and hedge funds-to coordinate with each other and combine their
individual holdings into a single, much larger voting block. It also became
much easier for shareholders to communicate with each other, and with the
general public, concerning their views on corporate policy. The result proved to
be "revolutionary" as the 1992 amendments "largely
deregulated proxy
78
contests and other shareholder insurgency activities."
3. The emergence of shareholderadvisory services
Another recent development that has magnified shareholders' collective
influence is the creation of commercial "shareholder advisory" services.
Shareholder advisory firms specialize in advising pension funds and mutual
funds, for a fee, how to vote the proxies of the shares held in their investment
portfolios. As a result, advisory services coordinate the voting policies of many
different institutional investors, effectively aggregating their shares into one
large voting block controlled, as a practical matter, by the advisory service
itself.
By far the largest and most influential shareholder advisory service today is
ISS Governance Services, formerly known as Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS). ISS offers to advise pension and mutual fund portfolio
managers on how to vote the shares in their portfolios on matters ranging from
director elections, to the approval of "poison pills," to the sale of the entire
company. 79 ISS claims to have 3500 clients worldwide. 80
The emergence of ISS as the dominant shareholder advisory service has
dramatically reduced the collective action problem traditionally thought to

76. See id at 686-97.
77. See id.More recently, the SEC adopted amendments to the federal proxy rules to
facilitate the use of electronic shareholder forums. Electronic Shareholder Forums, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-57172, Investment Company Act Release No. 28124, 73 Fed. Reg. 4450
(Jan. 25, 2008).
78. Id.at 684, 687; see also Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting
Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7,
2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (2006)).
79. An important source of ISS's present success is an SEC rule adopted in 2004
requiring mutual funds to disclose to their investors how fund managers are voting the stocks
held in their portfolios. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.30bt-4. Mutual funds have flocked to ISS to
"outsource" their proxy voting decisions. See Institutional S'holder Servs., Proxy Voting
Services for Institutional Investors, http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/votingservices.pdf.
80. See RiskMetrics Group, Corporate Profile, http://investors.riskmetrics.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=215573&p=irol-irhome.
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plague shareholders in public firms. Not only are more and more public
company shareholders large institutions, but those institutions increasingly
follow the advice of a single advisory firm. In short, the widely dispersed
individual shareholders of Berle & Means' day, who routinely voted with
corporate management, have been replaced to a great extent by a single and far
more independent-minded "voter"-ISS.8 1
4. The rise of activist hedgefunds
Increased institutional investing, the 1992 proxy rule amendments, and the
emergence of ISS have all worked together to make it easier for shareholders in
public companies to play a more active role in corporate affairs than it has ever
been before. Nevertheless, many large institutional investors continue to face at
least one significant obstacle to activism: They desire to maintain a diversified
investment portfolio. Pension and mutual funds in particular face significant
legal and market pressures to diversify. 82 As a result, any single company's
stock is likely to comprise only a small percentage (often far less than 1%) of
the diversified institution's portfolio, and, correspondingly, the institution is
likely to hold only a small percentage of any single company's outstanding
stock. Accordingly, a diversified institution may routinely vote the way ISS
recommends, even when this means voting against management. But it is
unlikely to pursue any deeper involvement in the company's affairs, calculating
that the benefits of activism (which are shared with all shareholders who own
stock in the company in question) are outweighed by the costs (which are born
solely by the institutional investor).
In recent years, however, a new type of institutional shareholder has
emerged for whom activism is more economically rational-the activist hedge
fund.83 Hedge funds are lightly regulated investment pools that cater to wealthy
investors and so are exempt from most of the disclosure requirements and other
legal burdens borne by mutual funds that take investment funds from the
general public. 84 Although many hedge funds rely on passive stock-picking

81. See Briggs, supra note 74, at 692-94, 702 (describing rise of lSS and how activist
hedge funds appeal to ISS in order to get its institutional clients to cast votes in support of
their battles with management).
82.

Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and

Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1049 (2007) (describing legal rules requiring
many mutual funds to diversify); id at 1057 n.174 (discussing pressure on pension funds to
diversify to comply with prudent investor rule); id. at 1070 ("[M]utual funds view and
market themselves as vehicles for diversification .... An activist strategy, however, does
not mesh well with a diversification objective .... ")
83. See generally Mara Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, Bus.
WK., Feb. 20, 2006, at 72; Henny Sender, Hedge Funds: The New Corporate Activists,
WALL ST. J., May 13, 2005, at Cl; Emily Thornton & Susan Zegel, Hedge Funds: The New
Raiders, Bus. WK., Feb. 28, 2005, at 32.
84. See generally William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95
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strategies, numerous high-profile funds use their shareholder status to push

aggressively for specific corporate actions.
Activist hedge funds do not attempt to diversify their portfolios. Instead,
they take large positions in as few as two or three companies and then demand
that those companies pay special dividends, launch massive stock buyback
programs, sell assets, or even put themselves on the auction block in order to
add "shareholder value." 85 The confrontational nature of activist funds is often
reflected in their names: Pirate Capital, Bulldog Investors, Steel Partners, and
86
Cerberus Capital, to name some notable examples.
Until recently, activist funds tended to target smaller companies, in which
they could acquire large voting blocks at relatively low cost. The popularity of
hedge funds has grown enormously in recent years, however, and by some
87
estimates hedge funds now control as much as two trillion dollars in assets.
Moreover, the 1992 proxy rule amendments have allowed funds to form "wolf
packs" of several funds that buy stakes in a company and together pressure its
managers. 8 8 Activist hedge funds' power and influence have grown to the point

where they are targeting much larger firms, including McDonald's, General
Motors, and Time Warner. 89 The result is a new genre of public company
shareholder that is aggressive, wealthy, and eager to play a role in setting
corporate policy. In the words of one industry insider, because
of activist hedge
90
funds, "the balance of power is shifting away from boards."

GEO. L.J. 1375 (2007); Kahan & Rock, supra note 82; Frank S. Partnoy & Randall S.
Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and FinancialInnovation (Vanderbilt Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 06-21, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-931254.
85. Interestingly, hedge funds seem to favor mergers and acquisitions only when they
own the target; they often object strenuously when they own the bidder. See Brent Shearer,
Dangerous Watersfor Dealmakers: ShareholderSharks Are Using Their Clout to Influence
Deals, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Mar. 2006, at 30-31 (describing how activist hedge funds
often oppose acquisitions by companies in which they have invested). Hedge funds'
inconsistent stance on business deals probably reflects a perception that bidding companies
tend to overpay, which is good news for shareholders in the target company but bad news for
the bidding company's shareholders. See generally Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment
in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597 (1989).
86. See Hovenesian, supra note 83, at 72 (describing Bulldog Investors); Thornton &
Zegel, supra note 83, at 32, 34 (discussing Pirate Capital, Steel Partners, and Cerberus
Capital Management).
87. See In Defense of Hedge Funds, Bus. WK., July 9, 2007, at 112 ("Hedge fund
assets could hit $2 trillion this year .... ").
88. Bratton, supra note 84, at 1379; Briggs, supra note 74, at 692; see also Thornton &
Zegel, supra note 83, at 34 ("[T]he new raiders often hunt in packs.").
89. Hovenesian, supra note 83, at 72.
90. Id. (quoting Banc of America Securities' head of global mergers and acquisitions);
see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 82, at 1024 ("Hedge funds have become critical players
in both corporate governance and corporate control."); Sender, supra note 83, at CI (quoting
Morgan Stanley's head of global corporate finance as saying that "hedge funds have become
the corporate activists of this generation").
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5. Financialinnovation

Yet another factor promoting greater shareholder activism is financial
innovation. In the early days of the corporation, investors generally could
choose between only two types of corporate securities: stocks and bonds, the
vanilla and chocolate of corporate finance. Today, the capital structures of
public firms have become far more complex. Investors can purchase not only
stocks and bonds
but also various alternative forms of equity, debt, and hybrid
91
instruments.
Financial innovation encourages shareholder activism in at least two ways.
First, it creates more incentives for activism because the more complex a
company's capital structure becomes, the more opportunities are presented for
investors who purchase one type of security to push for corporate actions that
harm the value of another type of security issued by the same company. For
example, a preferred stockholder in a troubled firm might push for an asset sale
to trigger its liquidation preference, while common shareholders demand a
risky strategy that could raise the value of the common if it succeeds but harms
the value of the preferred.92 We discuss this sort of "rob Peter to pay Paul"
investor activism in greater detail in Part II.B.3.
A second and more widely recognized reason why financial innovation has
encouraged shareholder activism is that it has lowered the cost of activist
93
strategies by allowing the separation of voting rights and economic interests.
Thus, a hedge fund can buy a block of common stock and vote the shares while
simultaneously entering a derivatives contract that hedges away its economic
interest in the stock. Indeed, the fund can take a negative economic position in
the firm by shorting its stock and then seek to profit from using its power as a
formal shareholder to push for business policies that drive the stock price
down.

94

91. See generally Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, The Modern Process of
FinancialInnovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273 (1991).
92. This consequence of capital structure complexity is discussed at some length in
Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 84, at 35-39 (describing this as "capital structure motivated
trading" and noting that such trades may be "no more than a redistribution of corporate
resources to debtholders or other slices of the capital structure to shareholders").
93. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting andHidden

(Morphable)Ownership: Taxonomy, Implication, and Reforms, 61 Bus. LAW. 1011 (2006)
[hereinafter Hu & Black, Empty Voting]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote
Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006)
[hereinafter Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying]; Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy,
EncumberedShares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and
Debt Decouplingand Empty Voting I: Importance andExtensions (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of

Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper & European Corporate Governance Institute Law Wkg.
Paper No. 122, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract =1030721.
94. This technique would involve the fund's "shorting" the firm's stock by borrowing
the stock from a broker and then selling it to a third party, subject to the obligation that the
fund must later reacquire the stock and return it to the broker. If the price of the stock drops,

HeinOnline -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1280 2007-2008

March 2008]

ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS

1281

The problem is not just theoretical. Although hard data about hedge fund
transactions and derivatives deals is hard to obtain, the business media has
reported a number of recent cases in which activist hedge funds have used
"empty voting" strategies in which the activist separates the right to vote shares
from the beneficial ownership of those shares, and these reported cases likely
reflect only the tip of the iceberg. 95 As a result, empty voting has attracted
96
widespread interest, and a number of scholars have proposed policy solutions.
rights
For now, activist strategies that divorce economic interests from voting
97
unseen."
often
and
unregulated
"largely
remain
corporations
in public
6. Proposed changes in shareholder voting rules

So far we have focused on developments that have already worked in
tandem to shift power in public corporations away from executives and boards
and into the hands of activist shareholders. The shift continues, however.
Shareholders stand to gain even more political leverage in the near future, as
witnessed by several important proposals for changes in the rules of
shareholder voting..
98
The most significant of these proposed changes relates to proxy access."
One of the greatest hurdles to shareholder action has been that dissident
shareholders seeking to mount a proxy battle against incumbent boards must
use their personal funds to do so, while incumbent boards can use corporate
funds. 99 The SEC recently solicited comments on a proposed rule change that
would have allowed a dissident shareholder holding 5% or more of outstanding
the fund will be able to cover its short position by purchasing the shares at the lower price.
The fund's profit would be the difference between the price at which the fund sold the
borrowed stock and the cost to repurchase the stock later, net of fees and expenses.
95. See Hu & Black, Empty Voting, supra note 93, at 1014-18, 1023-26 (identifying
multiple recently reported cases and describing difficulties of getting information).
96. See sources cited supra note 93.
97. Hu & Black, Empty Voting, supra note 93, at 1016.
98. Jeff Gordon suggests that an even more important development may be the advent
of e-proxy rules recently adopted by the SEC. These rules enable issuers and other soliciting
persons (including shareholders nominating directors) to deliver proxy materials by posting
the materials on a Web site and providing a notice relating to the posting. This development
should substantially reduce the cost to shareholders of waging a proxy contest. See Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of IncreasingShareholderPower: Forget IssuerProxy
Access and Focus on E-Proxy (Center for Law and Econ. Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of
=
Law, Working Paper No. 322, 2008) availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract 1085356.
99. See supra note 35. Because directors enjoy discretion to decide whether to pay the
campaign costs of dissident shareholders, shareholders challenging incumbent directors are
likely to be reimbursed for their expenses only if they succeed in gaining control over the
board. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Legal Policy
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1106-10 (1990). Other, more minor barriers
to shareholder action exist as well. For example, while shareholders have formal power to
elect and remove directors, they cannot call meetings to do so, but must wait until the next
regularly scheduled meeting. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 14 1(a), 211 (d) (2005).
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equity-an ownership threshold often met by activist hedge fundsl°°-to
propose a bylaw change that would allow the dissident to include its own
director nominees in the company's proxy solicitation materials. Although the
SEC ultimately elected not to adopt this version of the rule, the SEC Chairman
has announced his intention to continue to consider the matter.10 1 If some
version of the proposed rule change is adopted, it will dramatically reduce the
costs of shareholder activism for 5% shareholders by allowing them to use
corporate funds to finance their battles.
A second important proposed rule change currently awaiting approval by
the SEC is the NYSE's proposal to eliminate "broker voting." 1° 2 As much as
85% of exchange-traded securities are held by brokers and banks on behalf of
client investors, and a significant minority of those clients do not instruct the
brokerage on how to vote their shares. 10 3 NYSE rules allow brokers to vote
these clients' shares on "routine matters," including uncontested director
elections. Because brokers almost always vote as management suggests, the
result has been a reliable block of "broker votes" cast in incumbents' favor. If
the NYSE defines director elections as "non-routine," as it is currently
proposing, incumbent managers will lose this advantage, making it easier for
dissidents to mount a challenge.
Finally, a third significant shift toward greater shareholder power is taking
place at the firm level, as individual corporations rapidly adopt "majority
voting" rules in director elections.' 0 4 Under the default rules of corporate law,
directors are elected by plurality voting. ° 5 This means the director candidate
who receives the most votes wins, even if the total number of shares voting in
100. Briggs, supra note 74, at 697 (empirical study finding that activist funds often
take large positions of more than 10% of outstanding equity).
101. See Kara Scannell, Cox, In Denying Proxy Access, Puts His SEC Legacy on Line,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2007, at C1; Robert Schroeder, SEC Floats Reforms for Municipal
Securities Market, MARKET WATCH, July 26, 2007, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/
story/sec-floats-reforms-municipal-securities-market; Rachelle Younglai, US. SEC Mulls 5
Pct Ownership for Proxy Access, REUTERS, July 10, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/
articlePrint?articleld=USN0931053520070710.
102. NYSE, Inc., SR 2006-92 Proposal To Eliminate Discretionary Broker Voting for
the Election of Directors-Rule 452, (Oct. 24, 2006) and SR 2006-92 Amendment No. 1,
(May 23, 2007), available at http://www.nyse.com/regulation/rules/1160561784294.html;
Ted Allen, No Change in Broker Voting Before the 2008 Season, RISK & GOVERNANCE
WKLY.,available at http://www.issproxy.com/govemance weekly/2007/130.html.
103. Ted Allen, SEC Hears Testimony on Broker Votes, Risk & Governance Blog, May
25, 2007, http://blog.riskmetrics.com/2007/05/sechearstestimony on broker.html (citing

sources noting that 85% of exchange-traded securities are held by banks and brokerages and
that broker-cast votes account for 19% of votes cast at U.S. corporate meetings).
104. See generally Louis Lavelle, A Simple Way to Make Boards Behave, Bus. WK.,

Jan. 31, 2005, at 38.
105. See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed Oct.
23, 2003) ("[M]any companies use plurality rather than majority voting for board elections,
which means that candidates can be elected regardless of whether they receive a majority of
the security holder vote.").
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favor of the candidate falls far short of a majority. In response to activists'
demands, many corporations have recently adopted some version of a
majoritarian voting rule. Indeed, one recent study found that between 2006 and
2007, the percentage of Fortune 500 firms adopting some form of majority
voting policy rose from 20% to more than 50%.106 Because majority voting
rules essentially turn shareholder "withhold" votes into "no" votes, the net
effect of firm-level adoption of majority voting is to increase activist
shareholders' leverage over directors.
These are only a few examples of the many proposed reforms currently
being floated in the name of enhancing shareholder democracy. Not only have
shareholders become far more powerful, the trend shows every sign of
continuing.
B. The Conflicted Shareholder

Part I.C described how the idea of minority shareholder fiduciary duties
has been neglected in part because minority shareholders in public firms have
historically been perceived as passive and powerless. As we have just seen,
however, this traditional perception is no longer accurate. We now consider the
second belief that has led minority shareholder duties to receive scant
attention-the belief that, in the rare instances in which minority activists do
try to influence company policy, their efforts benefit all the firm's shareholders
because all shareholders share a single economic interest in maximizing share
price.
Like the presumption that minority shareholders are powerless, the belief
that minority shareholders share a common economic goal has also become
inaccurate. 107 Below, we explore some of the more common and troubling rifts
that arise between activists and other shareholders in public firms. In exploring
these conflicts it is important to understand that the shareholder schisms we
describe, although endemic, are not without limit. When we speak of conflicts
of interest between shareholders, we do not intend to describe simple
disagreements over business strategy. Just as officers and directors who do not
have personal economic stakes in an outcome enjoy the protections of the
business judgment rule when they choose among competing corporate
strategies, shareholders who do not have economic conflicts of interest should
be free to argue, and even agitate for, the corporate policies they think serve the
firm best.
Similarly, we do not intend to capture honest disagreement about the

106. Press Release, Claudia H. Allen, Neal, Gerber, & Eisenberg LLP, Majority
Voting in Director Elections-An Activist Success Story (Nov. 13, 2007), available at
http:///www.ngelaw.com/news/pubs detail.aspx?ID=777.
107. See generally Anabtawi, supra note 38, at 579-93 (describing many ways in
which shareholder interests can conflict).
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proper purpose of the corporation. The business media, and even some
scholars, often assert that the proper purpose of the corporation is to maximize
shareholder wealth without regard to the consequences for employees,
customers, or society. This idea enjoys only very limited support in corporate
law, however. 10 8 Corporate charters typically describe the purpose of the
company as anything lawful. 10 9 Modem case law and state "constituency
statutes" similarly make clear that directors of public companies are free, in
choosing firm policy, to consider not only shareholders' interests but also those
of employees, creditors, customers, and the broader society. 110 Shareholders
who are not tainted by an economic conflict of interest should similarly be free
to use their investor status to pressure corporate managers to pay decent wages,
produce safe products, and preserve the environment.
The analysis changes dramatically, however, when a shareholder stands to
capture a personal economic benefit, not captured by other shareholders, by
promoting a particular corporate outcome. Such situations can be directly
analogized to interested transactions by corporate officers and directors. Just as
officers and directors may be tempted to pursue self-interest at firm and
shareholder expense when they can use their corporate powers for their
personal profit, activist shareholders may be tempted to pursue self-interest at
firm and other shareholder expense when they can use their new-found
influence to benefit themselves. And, we argue in Part III, just as corporate law
duty of loyalty rules apply to officers' and directors' self-interested
transactions, self-interested shareholder activism should similarly trigger
shareholder loyalty duties.
Below, we briefly survey some of the most common and substantial
economic conflicts that have arisen between activists and other minority
shareholders in modem public firms. As we will see, the fault lines are many
and growing.Il' Far from sharing homogenous interests, minority shareholders
often find themselves at economic odds with each other, and the sources of
conflict are increasing.
1. Conflicts arisingfrom activists' transactionswith the corporation
We begin by considering the context in which the dangers of shareholder
108. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments

for ShareholderPrimacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1189 (2002).
109. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (2005); Stout, supra note 108, at 1206-07.
110. See Stout, supra note 108, at 1207.
111. Our examples are by no means exhaustive. For example, one potential conflict
that has attracted recent attention is the investment by sovereign wealth funds, pools of
capital controlled by foreign governments, in voting equities of U.S. banks. Sovereign
wealth fund investors potentially have economic and political interests that differ from those
of other shareholders. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, What Money Can Buy: Influence, N.Y.

TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2008, at Cl.
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self-interest may be most apparent, self-dealing transactions. As discussed in
Part I.B, corporate law views with suspicion any transaction between an officer
or director and the corporation which that officer or director serves. Similarly,
corporate law has long acknowledged that business transactions between
controlling shareholders and the corporations they control may pose loyalty
problems.
One of the leading cases on controlling shareholder duties, Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 112 offers a good example. Sinclair Oil owned 97% of the
equity of a subsidiary, Sinven. Sinclair used its control over Sinven to cause
Sinven to contract to sell all its oil products to another, wholly owned, Sinclair
subsidiary. The Delaware Supreme Court observed that "Sinclair's act of
contracting with its dominated subsidiary was self-dealing," and held Sinclair
liable for breach of its duty of loyalty because, through its domination of
Sinven, it allowed its wholly-owned subsidiary to breach the sales contract
in a
11 3
fashion intrinsically unfair to the 3% minority shareholders of Sinven.
The conventional understanding of shareholder loyalty duties reflected in
Sinclair applies only to controlling shareholders. Nevertheless, as minority
investors in public companies have acquired more power, it has become clear
that an activist minority may also have enough clout to push through interested
transactions. One of the earliest examples of this to appear on the scene was the
practice of greenmail. "Greenmail" refers to a corporate repurchase, at a
premium over market price, of a block of shares held by a minority investor
who is in some manner opposing the company's management by, for example,
threatening a proxy contest. 114 Greenmail was a common and troublesome
practice during the 1980s until Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code
116
in 1987 specifically to discourage it.115 Nevertheless, greenmail still occurs,
and it can be characterized as an interested transaction between the corporation
and a minority shareholder that has acquired leverage over the board and is
1 17
using it to reap a personal profit at other shareholders' expense.
The high profile proxy battle to remove Steven Burd as Chairman and CEO
of Safeway, Inc., provides another thought-provoking example of the many
ways activist investors can use their shareholder status to push for favorable
112. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
113. Id. at 723.

114. See, e.g., Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Icahn, 747 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Polk v.
Good, 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).
115. See I.R.C. § 5881 (2000). See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 82, at 1082
(discussing decline of greenmail); David Manry & David Stangeland, Greenmail: A Brief
History, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 217 (2001) (discussing decline of greenmail).

116. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 84, at 1413 (describing the 2002 greenmail payment
by Gyrodyne to K Capital).
117. Interestingly, while lawsuits have been brought challenging greenmail payments,
they have not claimed breach of shareholder duty but instead argued, unsuccessfully, either
that the shareholder who received greenmail committed extortion, or that the directors who
decided to pay greenmail breached their loyalty duties. See sources cited supra note 114.
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treatment in their other dealings with the firm. 1 18 Burd was taking a hard-line
stance in labor negotiations with the United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, which represents grocery workers. He argued that Safeway needed to
lower its labor costs to compete with non-unionized chains like WalMart. The
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), a large pension
fund representing California employees, organized a proxy campaign to remove
Burd from the comer office. It was soon revealed that the CalPERS campaign
had been initiated by CalPERS' President, Sean Harrigan, who was also a
career labor organizer and an official of the United Food & Commercial
Workers' Union. Burd survived the attempt to oust him after it was widely
reported that the grocery workers' union was
using CalPERS as a stand-in in its
119
benefits.
and
pay
over
Safeway
with
battle
These are only a few examples of the creativity shareholders have shown in
finding ways to use their shareholder status within the corporation to benefit
themselves in their business dealings with the company. The risk of selfdealing has long been recognized in the context of freeze-out mergers arranged
by controlling shareholders. But shareholders can enter into various other
corporate dealings, including stock repurchases, employment contracts, and
120
consulting and advisory agreements, that constitute interested transactions.
As they gain power in public firms, activist shareholders are demonstrating the
same willingness to abuse their influence by promoting self-dealing
transactions that controlling shareholders have previously exhibited.
2. Conflicts arisingfrom activists' interests in derivatives or securities of
other corporations

Conflicts of interest between activists and other shareholders in the firm
can also arise when activist shareholders take "adverse positions" in derivatives
or in securities issued by other companies. This possibility has attracted a good
deal of media and scholarly attention in recent months in the wake of reports of
several instances in which hedge funds with a clear conflict of interest
employed activist tactics. 12 1 One such troubling scenario arises when an
118. See Tom Petruno, Backlash Confronts CalPERS, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at
Cl; James F. Pletz, Pension Funds Seek to Oust Safeway Chairman, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2004, at Cl; Jenny Strasburg, Safeway CEO Burd Survives Vote: Campaign to Strip Him of
Chairman Role Falls Short, S.F. CHRON., May 21, 2004, at Cl.
119. See sources cited supra notes 118-21. While Burd survived, Harrigan was soon
removed from the CalPERS board. Tom Petruno, Business Applauds Shake-Up at CalPERS,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at Al.
120. See Emily Thornton, Gluttons at the Gate, Bus. WK., Oct. 30, 2006, at 58, 59
(reporting that private equity firms are using their shareholder status "to collect an array of
dubious fees" from firms including "advisory," "management," and "transaction" fees).
121. See generally Bratton, supra note 84 (discussing phenomenon and media-reported
cases); Hu & Black, Empty Voting, supra note 93 (discussing phenomenon and mediareported cases); Kahan & Rock, supra note 82 (discussing phenomenon and media-reported
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activist becomes a formal shareholder with voting power while simultaneously
either "shorting" the company's shares or entering into a derivatives contract to
hedge away its economic interest. For example, a hedge fund recently mounted
a proxy battle at Exar Corporation despite the fact that the fund held less than
1% of Exar's shares and had hedged away almost all of its economic interest
even in that small position through offsetting short transactions. 122 Indeed,
taking a net short position in a company allows an activist investor to profit
from using its status as a formal
shareholder to push for corporate strategies
12 3
that drive share price down.
A second difficulty arises when activists take adverse positions in
securities of another company. As one pair of scholars describe the problem, "a
hedge fund that owns shares in Company A may try to use that position to
increase the value of another position, say in Company B, rather than to
maximize the share price of Company A.' 124 To take one example, a number of
hedge funds with equity holdings in MONY, a publicly held insurance
corporation, supported the highly contested purchase of MONY by French
conglomerate AXA. These funds also held convertible debt issued by AXA, the
value of which would
rise if the deal went through. 125 The merger was
26
narrowly approved. 1
On other occasions, a shareholder activist may combine both types of
adverse interests. One of the most attention-grabbing recent cases of this sort of
conflict of interest involved the potential purchase of King Pharmaceuticals by
Mylan Laboratories. 127 Hedge fund Perry Capital, which had recently
purchased nearly 10% of Mylan's common stock, supported the acquisition
although industry observers perceived the deal as overpriced. Perry turned out
to have a good reason to want Mylan to overpay for King. Perry was also a
large shareholder in King, and it had used a derivatives contract to hedge away
its economic interest in the Mylan shares it had purchased. Thus Perry stood to
make money if the deal went through even if Mylan's shares declined, as
bidding companies' shares often do in mergers. (An amusing irony of the case
was the fact that the proposed acquisition sparked bitter complaints from Carl
Icahn, a shareholder activist who has built a career out of pushing managers to
sell assets and companies. In this case, however, Icahn held the acquirer

cases); Martin & Partnoy, supra note 93 (discussing phenomenon and media-reported cases);
Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 84 (discussing phenomenon and media-reported cases).
122. Briggs, supra note 74, at 702 (describing the Exar case).
123. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit

Derivatives, 75 U. CrN. L. REv. 1019, 1035 (2007) (describing such investors as "Darth
Vader monitor[s]" of shareholder value).
124. Kahan & Rock, supra note 82, at 1071.
125. See id.at 1073-74 (describing the present case).
126. See id. at 1074.
127. See generally id at 1075-77 (describing the Mylan-King case and media
coverage).

HeinOnline -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1287 2007-2008

1288

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1255

1 28

Mylan's stock.)
Although the phenomenon of activist shareholders holding adverse
positions in derivatives and other companies' securities has attracted much
129
scholarly attention, including recent articles in the Georgetown Law Review,
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 130 and Southern California Law
Review, 13 1 the magnitude of the problem remains unclear. Some insight can
nonetheless be gathered from an empirical study published recently in the
Journalof CorporationLaw.132 It reports that, of fifty media-covered cases of
activist hedge fund campaigns identified during a twenty-month period, six
cases (12%) involved "questionable situations" in which the hedge fund had
conflicts of interest due to investments in derivatives or other companies.
Moreover, as the author observes, this figure may understate the incidence of
conflicts because hedge funds must only disclose their interests in 13D filings
when they acquire 5% or more of a company's securities, and "a competently
advised fund that is truly bent on behavior that might not do well in the sun is
simply not going to purchase enough shares to require a Schedule 13D
13 3
filing.-"
3. Conflicts arisingfrom activists' investments in otherparts of the
corporation'scapitalstructure
Yet a third source of conflict between shareholders in public firms, alluded
to in Part II.A.5, is the increasingly complex capital structure of American
corporations. Even when a company issues only two kinds of securities-say,
common stock and debt-options theory predicts an inevitable conflict of
interest between the debtholders (who want to preserve the company's "equity
cushion" and avoid risk) and the stockholders (who favor risk because they
enjoy all the upside while sharing the burden of the downside with the
debtholders). 134 Today, however, most corporations issue not just common
stock and debt but also preferred stock, convertible securities, warrants,
collateralized debt obligations, and a host of other financial instruments. The
potential for conflict between holders of different classes of securities has
128. See supra note 85 (discussing how activists often oppose mergers and
acquisitions when they have invested in the bidder).
129. Bratton, supranote 84.
130. Kahan & Rock, supra note 82.
131. Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 93.
132. Briggs, supra note 74.

133. Id.at 703-04. Curiously, even after finding a 12% incidence of potential conflicts
in high-profile media-reported cases and observing that much bad behavior may be "under
the radar," the author concludes "hedge fund activists rarely pursue strategies that cannot
withstand the light of day." Id. at 703.
134. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES
(8th ed. 2006) (discussing the conflict of interest between
bondholders and stockholders).
OF CORPORATE FNANCE 482
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multiplied enormously. What's more, activist investors, especially hedge funds,
have learned that they can profit from such conflict by taking positions in two
different types of securities issued by the same corporation, and using the
control rights associated with one type of security to increase the economic
value of their holdings in the other type.
DiLillo v. Ustman Technologies, Inc. 135 illustrates the point. Sagaponack
Partners, a private investment partnership headed by hedge fund manager BarryRosenstein, invested $7 million in a small environmental services company
(Ustman Technologies). In exchange, Sagaponack received high-interest
secured notes and 40% of the company's common stock. According to their
terms, the secured notes were soon converted into preferred stock with a
liquidation preference of $17 million that could be triggered by the sale of
substantially all the company's assets.
Only two years after making its initial $7 million investment, Sagaponack
invested another $750,000 to increase its equity ownership in Ustman to 48.5%
of common shares. At this point, Sagaponack used its influence over Ustman's
board, a majority of whom were Sagaponack investors, to cause the board 136
to
sell substantially all the company's assets to a third party for $17.3 million.
All the proceeds from the sale went to pay Ustman's debts and Sagaponack's
liquidation preference, with nothing remaining for the common shareholders.
Sagaponack thus used its leverage as Ustman's largest single common
shareholder to push through an asset sale that transformed Ustman into an
empty shell and rendered its common stock worthless, but also approximately
doubled 7 Sagaponack's initial investment of $7.75 million after only three
3

years. 1

Sagaponack held such a large block of Ustman common stock that it was
arguably a controlling shareholder subject to loyalty duties under conventional
analysis. Indeed, this is almost certainly why a lawsuit was filed and the
conflict of interest came to light. Nevertheless, DiLillo illustrates how an
activist investor can profit from taking a position in one type of security issued
by a company (e.g., Ustman common stock), and then using the control rights
associated with that security to push for corporate action that diminishes the
value of that security but increases the value of another type of security issued
135. No. B148198, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 1527 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2001).
136. The asset sale also required the approval of a majority of Ustman's common
shares. Sagaponack accomplished this by approaching a few other small Sagaponack
shareholders and offering to buy their shares at market price after telling them that if they
refused to sell, Sagaponack would simply buy shares on the open market and they would be
left with nothing after Sagaponack pushed through the asset sale. Faced with this threat, the
shareholders sold, Sagaponack acquired just over 50% of Ustman's common, and the asset
sale was approved.
137. To add insult to injury, Rosenstein subsequently published an op-ed in the
FinancialTimes entitled "Activism is Good for All Shareholders." Barry Rosenstein, Op-Ed,
Activism Is Goodfor All Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at 17. This undoubtedly

came as news to Ustman's other common shareholders.
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by the same corporation (in DiLillo, the Ustman preferred), in which the
activist investor has an even larger economic interest.
For a number of reasons, it is difficult to get data on how often activist
shareholders face these sorts of conflicts of interest. For one thing, because
hedge funds are largely unregulated, it is difficult to get information about their
investments and activities. For another, activists tend to target smaller
companies, like Ustman Technologies, that are not followed by the media.
Finally, because the conventional understanding of shareholder fiduciary duties
confines those duties to controlling shareholders, litigation is unlikely unless an
activist holds such a large stake that other shareholders can argue the activist is
a "controlling" shareholder. We are unaware of any empirical study that sheds
light on how often activists are tainted by conflicts due to investments in other
parts of the company's capital structure. Anecdotal reports suggest, however,
that it is not rare and may indeed be common for activists to take positions in
more than one type of security issued by the same company. 138 To the extent
this is true, conflicts of interest between activists who own multiple pieces of
the company's capital structure and other investors who do not are unavoidable.
4. Conflicts arisingfrom activists' short investment horizons

Finally, we turn to a source of investor conflict that has received
considerable recent attention, the conflict between short-term investors who
plan to sell their shares within days or months, and longer-term investors who
hold their securities for years or decades. 139 The possibility of conflicts
between these two types of investors is easy to understand. Less
straightforward is whether the expanded shareholder duty we propose can be
usefully applied to address the conflict. 140 We offer the discussion below as a
possible application of our theory that deserves further consideration.
Actively managed mutual funds are notoriously short-term investors,
tuming over 100% or more of their portfolios each year. 14 1 Hedge funds are
even more hyperactive and may turn over their portfolios three times
138. See, e.g., Briggs, supra note 74, at 701-02 (describing activist campaign by hedge
fund Deephaven against MCI in which Deephaven held both MCI bonds and MCI stock);
Thornton, supra note 120, at 64 (discussing how activist investor Tennenbauni Capital
Partners held both equity and notes of Radnor Holdings and used its positions to influence
corporate affairs); see also Jeffrey M. Leavitt, BurnedAngels: The Coming Wave of Minority
Shareholder Oppression Claims in Venture Capital Start-up Companies, N.C. J.L. & TECH.

223, 226-27 (2005) (describing frequent conflicts arising between venture capital firms that
hold different classes of securities and other shareholders in start-up companies).
139. See Anabtawi, supra note 38, at 579-83; Kahan & Rock, supra note 82, at 108387; Jesse Eisinger, Subplot in Contestfor MCI: Fast Money vs. the Long Term, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 9, 2005, at C1.
140. See infra text accompanying note 178 (discussing difficulties created by requiring
plaintiff to show defendant received unique benefit).
141. See Anabtawi, supra note 38, at 579.
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annually. 142 This short-term focus stands in stark contrast to the investing
companies, and many individual
styles of index funds, pension funds, insurance
1 43
investors, who often hold shares for years.
The result, it has been suggested, is short-term activists pressuring
managers to pursue policies that raise share price in the short term but fail to
help the company, and even harm it, in the long term. 144 Activists sometimes
respond that conflict between short-term and long-term horizons is impossible:
If market prices reflect a company's "true value," any increase in stock price
must reflect an equivalent increase in value that benefits short-term and longterm alike. 145 This argument, however, relies on the so-called Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis (ECMH), a once-popular economic theory that was
believed to demonstrate that stock prices accurately capture the fundamental
economic values of corporations. In recent years, however, the ECHM has
fallen into serious disrepair. Extensive evidence demonstrates, and
contemporary theorists generally concede, that stock market prices often 4depart
16
substantially from reasonable estimates of fundamental economic value.
In particular, the "new finance" literature suggests at least three strategies
for raising share price without improving corporate performance. The first is to
sell the company: targets typically sell at substantial premiums, while bidding
company stocks often decline. 147 Second, a special dividend or stock
repurchase can raise stock price without improving corporate performance by
taking advantage of downward-sloping demand. 148 Third, stock price can be
driven upward temporarily by increasing short-term earnings at the expense of
long-term results, e.g., by cutting research and development, or by moving
revenues from future periods into the current accounting period. 149
142. Id.
143. Id.

144. One German politician has famously described activist investors as "locusts." See
David Reilly, A Hedge-Fund Honeymoon Is Over: German Regulator BaFin Is Probing
Investor Activity in Deutsche Boerse Ouster, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2005, at C3.
145. See Rosenstein, supra note 137, at 17 ("[T]he 'short-term' versus 'long-term'
distinction is often a nonsensical cover-up for poor performance .... Activists generally
seek to cause the stock price to reflect a company's true value, which is in the best interest of
supposed 'short-term' and 'long-term' investors alike.").
146. For an extensive survey of the theoretical weaknesses of the ECMH, the empirical
evidence against it, and its rapidly declining acceptance among experts, see Lynn A. Stout,
The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance,28 J. CoRP. L.

635, 653-54 (2003).
147. A number of reasons for this peculiar pattern have been suggested, including
bidder "hubris" and a downward-sloping demand curve for the target's stock. See Black,
supra note 85, at 625 (quoting Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J.
Bus. 197 (1986)); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price,
Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1239 (1990); Stout, supra note 146, at
645.
148. See Jesse M. Fried, Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market
Repurchases, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1323, 1332 (2005); Stout, supra note 147, at 1239.
149. Anabtawi, supra note 38, at 581-82.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, activist hedge funds tend to favor all three of
these strategies. 150 As a result, it is possible that many activists are using their
influence to push for corporate transactions that will provide them with a
personal benefit-a higher stock price in the short term-while providing no
benefit, or even harming, longer-term shareholders. Short-term activists were
accused of playing just such a role when they objected to a planned merger
between MCI and Verizon in favor of a sale of MCI at a higher price to Qwest.
Highly leveraged Qwest lacked the financial strength of Verizon, and MCI's
board feared that if MCI merged with Qwest, long-term investors who retained
their interest in the merged entity would suffer. 15 1 Similarly, when a hedge
fund controlled by Carl Icahn recently acquired nearly 3% of Motorola, it
immediately demanded that Motorola not only drain its cash reserves but also
take on additional debt in order to fund a massive stock buyback of up to $15
billion. Motorola insiders and industry analysts denounced the plan as a shortterm strategy that would harm the company's
future by draining it of the cash
152
needed for research and innovation.
From a social welfare perspective, strong arguments can be raised for
deterring short-term activists' attempts to profit from temporarily raising prices.
At best it is nonproductive "rent-seeking" (acquiring wealth by taking it from
someone else, rather than by creating it) 53 that distracts managers and requires
companies to spend time and money either resisting, or arranging, transactions
that do not improve performance. At worst, it drains companies of resources
they need for a healthy future. Thus it may be desirable to interpret shareholder
duties in a fashion that deters short-term investors from using their formal
status as shareholders to push 1for
corporate strategies that they believe will
54
temporarily inflate stock prices.

150. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 84, at 1379 (noting that hedge funds typically seek
sale of the company or a division, or a large cash payment from a special dividend or stock
repurchase); id. at 1413 (noting that activists also often push to cut "excess" costs like
research and development).
151. Anabtawi, supra note 38, at 582-83; Eisinger, supra note 139.
152. Roben Farzad, Activist Investors Not Welcome: Icahn 's Interference at Motorola
Stands in the Way ofIts Mission, Bus. WK., Apr. 9, 2007, at 36.

153. A short-term investor who temporarily raises a company's stock price and then
sells the stock to someone else is essentially profiting at the buyer's expense. See generally
Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?: Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Security Regulation, 81 VA. L. REv. 611 (1995) (discussing zero-sum nature of speculative
trading from an investor welfare perspective). When rent-seeking imposes costs, it becomes
a negative-sum game.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 139-51.
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III.TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SHAREHOLDER FIDUCIARY DUTIES

A. Past andProposedResponses to Activist ShareholderOverreaching
As we saw in Part I, the twin assumptions that minority shareholders are
passive and powerless, and that they share homogenous interests, have
distracted attention away from the question of shareholder duties. Instead,
corporate scholarship has focused on the "agency cost" problem of protecting
dispersed shareholders in public firms from managerial (and, sometimes,
controlling shareholder) overreaching. It is becoming increasingly apparent,
however, that minority investors can play the part of corporate villain as well as
corporate victim. This was first widely recognized in the 1980s, when attention
focused on the activities of individual "raiders" and the practice of greenmail.
More recently, the focus has been on hedge funds, as the SEC has pondered
their regulation and law reviews have published1 55a slew of scholarly articles
discussing the "dark side" of hedge fund activism.
Part II argued that activist shareholder overreaching is only likely to grow
as shareholders become more powerful and more divided. How, then, should
corporate law respond to this development? So far, regulators have tended to
address minority shareholder opportunism in an ad hoc fashion that focuses on
particular activists or particular activist tactics. For example, during the 1980s,
the practice of greenmail received considerable negative attention. Congress
responded by amending the tax code to impose a discouraging tax on greenmail
payments. 156 Similarly, as hedge funds became more powerful, the SEC
attempted to regulate15 7them by requiring hedge fund managers to register as
investment advisors.
Corporate scholars have also generally responded to instances of
shareholder overreaching by proposing ad hoc solutions that discourage
particular forms of shareholder misbehavior yet leave the door open for
activists to devise even more ingenious, alternative means of enriching
themselves at others' expense. Frank Partnoy and Shaun Martin, for example,
suggest that one policy response to the problem of voting "encumbered" shares
is to allocate votes based not on formal title to shares but on real "ownership"
of the economic residual interest in a corporation's equity.1 58 Even assuming
this is achievable, it does nothing to address the possibility that activists will

155. See supra notes 74, 82, 84, 93.
156. See supra text accompanying note 115.
157. The D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC's rule six months later, and the agency is still
mulling its response. See Troy A. Paredes, Hedge Funds and the SEC: Observations on the
How and Why of Securities Regulation 4-6 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis, Sch. of Law, Working
Paper No. 07-05-01, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-984450 (discussing 2004

SEC rule).
158. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 93, at 804-09.

HeinOnline -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1293 2007-2008

1294

STANFORD LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 60:1255

turn to other, equally ingenious ways to pursue self-interest. 159 Henry Hu and
Bernard Black suggest enhanced disclosure when investors use derivatives to
decouple votes from economic interest, but acknowledge a more substantive
response may be needed. 160 Lucian Bebchuk, a dedicated advocate of greater
shareholder power, has similarly offered ad hoc solutions in response to the
objection that some short-term investors might use their increased influence to
promote corporate strategies that harm the firm's long-run prospects. For
example, Bebchuk argues that if short-termism is a problem, then shareholder
proposals can be required to garner majority approval in not one but two
successive annual meetings.161
What academics and regulators have failed to recognize is that the
foregoing instances of perverse shareholder incentives are neither isolated nor
unique. Rather, they are symptoms of a larger underlying problem-the
problem of reining in minority shareholder opportunism in public corporations
as shareholders become more powerful and more diverse. By their very nature,
responses tailored to particular forms of shareholder opportunism tend to do a
poor job of addressing concerns about shareholder conflicts of interest beyond
the specific situation at hand. To take just one example, Bebchuk's proposal
cannot address shareholder conflicts of interest unrelated to the time horizon
over which investors expect to hold their shares. Ad hoc solutions also tend to
be after-the-fact (they are imposed after the problem has already become large
enough to attract attention) and to lack proportionality (they remain in place
even if the problem proves not to be as serious as originally feared, or
disappears entirely). Finally, they are overbroad, regulating categories of
entities and types of transactions without regard to whether the particular entity
or action poses a problem.
B. FiduciaryDuties as a Response to ShareholderOverreaching

We suggest treating the underlying disease, rather than merely trying to
ameliorate its symptoms. The underlying disease is shareholder opportunism, a
problem that parallels the officer and director opportunism that has received so
much attention in the corporate law literature on "agency costs." Perhaps there
is a ready remedy for shareholder opportunism that mirrors the remedy
corporate law has developed for officer and director opportunism-the broad
159. See id. at 792-93 (acknowledging this point).
160. Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 93, at 864 (proposing disclosure
of the ownership of voting rights and economic interests in shares as an initial step to
addressing decoupling).
161. Bebchuk, The Case for IncreasingShareholder Power, supra note 8, at 870-75,
883-84 (claiming that appropriate rule design, such as holding and ownership requirements,
can address concerns that shareholders will use their power to serve their own interests, and
particularly proposing that a proposal approved in an annual meeting could become effective
only after the next annual meeting, if no decis'on to reverse the earlier decision is approved
in that meeting).
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application of shareholder fiduciary duties in general, and the duty of loyalty in
particular.
In this Part, we reexamine the conventional understanding of shareholder
loyalty duties with an eye to adapting those duties to fit recent changes in
shareholder influence and interest. As we saw in Part I.B, conventional analysis
treats shareholder fiduciary duties as exceptional in nature, with shareholders
generally presumed to be free to pursue their self-interest except when they
exercise a degree of control over the firm equivalent to that of the corporation's
directors. An observer so inclined could interpret case law even more narrowly,
restricting controlling shareholders' fiduciary obligations to just freeze-outs and
closely held corporations.
We believe that such a restrictive reading is neither necessary nor wise.
Instead, we propose that all shareholders, like all directors and officers, be
viewed as owing latent duties to the firm and their fellow shareholders. These
latent duties would be triggered whenever a particular shareholder-whether or
not it is technically a shareholder capable of controlling the boards' decisions
as to all matters-in fact manages to successfully influence the company's
actions with regard to a particular issue in which that shareholder has a
material, personal economic interest. In other words, we believe that it is now
time to expand both our notions of when a shareholder should be deemed to
have "control" and our conception about the kinds of circumstances in which
the exercise of that control poses a threat to the firm or to other shareholders.
Our suggested approach has two principal components. First, shareholder
fiduciary duties would not, as it is now, be triggered by a particular
shareholder's ability to direct corporate decision-making in the abstract, but
rather by that shareholder's ability to influence the outcome of a particular
corporate decision in which it has a personal conflict of interest. This change in
level of analysis-from the general corporate level to the level of a discrete
issue-defines the idea of "control" more expansively to account for the reality
that modem shareholders can influence corporate policy through a variety of
strategies that do not require them to control a numerical majority of the firm's
voting shares. 162 Thus, we would say that a shareholder "controls" corporate
or "but for," cause of the
conduct whenever its action is a determinative,
16 3
issue.
in
decision
corporate
particular
Second, we take the position that the duty of loyalty should be activated by
any factual situation-including, but not limited to, freeze-outs and closely held
corporations-in which a shareholder seeks to promote a corporate strategy or
162. ISS has stated that constructive dialogue between shareholders and corporations
has replaced confrontation, with communications taking "place off stage, the results out of
the limelight." INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., 2004 POSTSEASON REPORT, A NEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WORLD: FROM CONFRONTATION TO CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE 3
(2004), availableat http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2004ISSPSR.pdf.
163. See Hetherington, supra note 36, at 935 ("[A]n adverse interest becomes
important only when the shareholder's vote determines the outcome of a corporate issue.").

HeinOnline -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1295 2007-2008

1296

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1255

transaction in which that particular shareholder has a material, personal
pecuniary interest. This approach recognizes that, while shareholder conflicts
of interest are perhaps most obvious in freeze-outs and closely held
corporations, they can arise in a host of other situations as well, including
conflicts over merger strategies, special dividend declarations, and stock
repurchases.
Our proposal may at first appear a radical reconception of shareholder
fiduciary duty. We believe, however, that it is in fact a natural extension of
basic corporate law principles, as well as faithful to the underlying purposes of
fiduciary doctrine. Indeed, we argue that the foundations of an expanded
shareholder duty have already been laid in existing case law. Moreover, our
approach offers a response to activist shareholder misbehavior that is
simultaneously sweeping and tailored to the problem at hand, and that employs
the strength and adaptability of the common law to deal with conflicts of
interest as they arise, and not just after the fact.
The balance of corporate decision-making power between managers and
shareholders is shifting rapidly in the direction of shareholders. If that shift is to
prove beneficial-if the move toward greater "shareholder democracy" is to
increase shareholder value rather than destroy it-it must not take place
without limitation. Rights must be coupled with responsibilities, and the
common law doctrine of shareholder fiduciary duty is especially well suited to
meet this challenge.
1. Expanding the notion of control
The purpose of corporate fiduciary duties is to restrain self-interested
behavior by persons in a position to exert control over the corporate entity.
Existing case law already applies this principal not only to corporate officers
and directors but also to shareholders When shareholders exercise corporate
power, they "are acting for the corporation and for each other, and they cannot
use their corporate power in bad faith or for their individual advantage or
purpose." ' 164 The key question is what form and degree of control over the
corporation must a shareholder exercise to trigger fiduciary duties.
In answering this question, it is important to bear in mind, as Deborah
DeMott has cautioned, that "[s]hareholders' control is often latent and indirect
in form." 16 5 It is a mistake to view the idea of shareholder control as an all-ornothing inquiry (either a shareholder has complete "control" or it has none).
Shareholder power and influence can depend on context. At one extreme lies
the sole shareholder who holds 100% of a firm's outstanding voting stock and

164. Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 123 N.E. 148, 152 (N.Y. 1919) (citation
omitted).
165. Deborah A. DeMott, The Mechanisms of Control, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 233, 236

(1999).
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enjoys virtually complete authority over every decision made by the firm's
board of directors. 166 At the other extreme is the rationally apathetic, atomized
individual investor who has no influence over anything and indeed cannot be
bothered to return a proxy by mail. Between these two extremes lies a vast
range of possible allocations of power between individual shareholders and
directors. Indeed, more than one shareholder or shareholder
group can be said
67
to "control" the firm in some fashion or another. 1
The inquiry into whether or not a shareholder has control for purposes of
activating the latent duty of loyalty is, accordingly, best framed as an inquiry
into whether a particular shareholder can, formally or informally, influence
corporate behavior with respect to a particular issue. The relationship between
shareholder and board need not be as close as that of "puppeteer" and
"puppet." 168 Any attempt to exercise influence that produces the desired
result-put differently, any shareholder act that is a "but for" cause of some
corporate transaction or strategy-is an exercise of de facto shareholder
control.
This formulation goes beyond the scope of the traditional shareholder
control test in two important ways. First, it is context-specific, meaning it
determines whether a shareholder is a controlling shareholder by referring to
the role that the shareholder played with respect to a particular corporate
decision. If a minority shareholder influences a particular corporate action, such
as a decision to declare an extraordinary dividend, in a determinative way, it
will have satisfied the control test with regard to that specific action.
A second, related distinction between our definition of shareholder control
and the existing test is that our formulation does not rely on the sort of arbitrary
threshold for voting power that underlies current doctrine. Contemporary case
law automatically deems a shareholder "controlling" if it has the right to vote a
majority of the company's outstanding shares. Although in theory the control
test can reach less-than-majority shareholders, as we saw Part I.B.2, courts
have set a high bar for finding a minority shareholder has exercised "actual
control," holding the test met primarily when the minority shareholder controls
such a large block it represents a majority of the shares likely to be voted, given
other shareholders' rational apathy. 169 In contrast, our test would treat even a
1% shareholder as controlling if that shareholder's assent were essential in
determining the outcome of the vote at issue. Moreover, our formulation
recognizes that minority shareholders can exercise control even when they are
166. We say "virtually" because even here there are marginal procedural costs
involved in replacing the board. Even 100% shareholders "once having elected directors,
(do] not have a right thereafter to interfere. To impose a duty of obedience on directors...
would conflict with the fundamental point that corporate law assigns ultimate managerial
power and responsibility to directors." Id. at 253 (footnote omitted).
167. See infra text accompanying note 174.
168. Zahn v. Transamerica, Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 44-54.
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not voting. For example, a shareholder may be able to determine a board's
decision with regard to a particular matter-say, a share repurchase programby threatening a proxy battle, or by undertaking an aggressive public relations
campaign directed at the board. This is a favorite tactic of hedge fund
managers, who have been known to personally attack
a CEO for "play[ing]
' 170
tennis and hobnob[bing] with [his] fellow socialites."
Traditional case law offers a basis for this expanded notion of shareholder
control. Smith v. Atlantic Properties,Inc. 171 is an oft-cited decision involving a
closely held corporation with four shareholders and a charter provision that
required dividends to be approved by an 80% shareholder vote, giving each of
the four partners an effective veto. After one shareholder had a falling-out with
the other three, he steadfastly refused to approve dividends, either out of spite
or a desire to minimize his personal tax liability. The unfortunate effect was to
trigger tax penalties on Atlantic Properties' accumulated earnings, to the
distress of the other three shareholders, who filed suit. The court found that the
recalcitrant minority shareholder had violated his duty of loyalty to his fellow
shareholders, quoting case law for the principle that shareholders "may not act
out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty
to the other shareholders and to the corporation." 172 The court went on to
observe that the 80% provision, by giving the minority shareholder power to
veto dividends, had "substantially the effect of reversing the usual roles of the
majority and the minority shareholders.173The minority, under that provision,
becomes an ad hoc controlling interest."
Smith v. Atlantic Properties is a closely

held

corporation

case.

Nevertheless, its logic applies equally well to minority shareholders in public
companies. When a single shareholder's actions determine the outcome-when
an activist successfully extracts greenmail, or a hedge fund with a 5% stake
casts the deciding vote in a hotly-contested merger-that minority activist, like
the minority shareholder in Smith v. Atlantic
Properties,has exercised "ad hoc"
174

control and triggered latent loyalty duties.

170. Kahan & Rock, supra note 82, at 1029 (quoting Third Point Demands That Star
Gas CEO, Irik Sevin, Resigns and Returns Keys to Company Car, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14,

2005 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
171. 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
172. Id. at 801 (quoting Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
173. Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
174. As the second example suggests, when a vote is hotly contested, more than one
shareholder may be in a position to cast the block of votes that carries the day. For example,
when a merger is approved by a 51% to 49% shareholder vote, any shareholder that holds
2% or more of the company's shares and votes those shares in favor of the merger can be
said to exercise ad hoc control and be a "but for" cause of the merger. It is important to
recognize that this does not mean that any shareholder holding 2% or more who votes in
favor of the merger is subject to potential liability, however. Shareholder fiduciary duties are
only triggered when the shareholder in question not only exercised ad hoc control, but also
had a significant conflict of interest. In such a case, close scrutiny of the fairness of the
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2. Expanding the notion of shareholderconflicts of interest
In addition to expanding the idea of shareholder control, our approach
would also expand the application of shareholder fiduciary duties in a second
fashion, by applying the duty of loyalty to any corporate transaction or strategy
that provides one or more shareholders with a material, personal pecuniary
benefit not shared by other shareholders. This approach rejects any claim that
shareholder conflicts of interest arise only in freeze-outs and closely held
corporations, or that shareholder fiduciary duties should be limited to those
contexts. Instead, we propose a broad-brush approach that mirrors the flexible
approach typically taken in duty of loyalty cases involving corporate officers
and directors. Rather than trying to identify isolated instances which
shareholder conflicts arise, our approach instead asks the larger question
typically asked in director and officer fiduciary duty cases: Does the
shareholder have any material economic interest, in any form, that is different
from other shareholders' interests in the matter?
Despite the common pattern of courts applying shareholder fiduciary duties
primarily in the freeze-out and closely held corporation contexts, an openended and fact-specific approach to finding potential conflicts is consistent with
corporate case law and particularly with the seminal case of Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien. 175 In Sinclair, the controlling parent corporation did not exploit the
minority shareholders in its partially held subsidiary by arranging a freeze-out
merger. Rather, it used its control over the subsidiary to benefit itself by
causing the subsidiary to sell it petroleum products on favorable terms. Sinclair
thus illustrates how, when presented with fact patterns that fall outside the
standard freeze-out context but nevertheless raise clear conflict of interest
issues, courts have responded by imposing loyalty duties on controlling
shareholders.
We would also incorporate another important aspect of conventional
loyalty doctrine into our proposed expansion of shareholder duties, the
principle that a conflict of interest can exist not only when a shareholder causes
the corporation to pursue a transaction or strategy that clearly and affirmatively
harms the corporation or other shareholders but also when the controlling
shareholder uses his power over the corporation to promote a transaction that
does not result in obvious harm but provides the controlling shareholder with a
personal benefit that is not shared with other shareholders. This prophylactic
rule is designed to discourage self-interested behavior in situations in which it
may be difficult or impossible to prove actual injury to the corporation. When it
is applied, the appropriate remedy is not to try to measure harm, but instead to
require the shareholder to disgorge any personal benefit reaped from the tainted

shareholder's action is both appropriate and desirable.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15 (discussing Sinclair).
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transaction.1 76 When a more expansive view of who exactly is a "controlling"
shareholder is combined with Sinclair's fact-intensive approach to finding
conflicts of interest and the principle that an unshared benefit may be a loyalty
violation, 17 7 shareholder fiduciary duty rules can address many of the forms of
opportunistic minority shareholder conduct in public corporations discussed in
Part ILB.
3. Incorporatingtraditionalloyalty defenses

On first inspection, the suggestion that all shareholders should be subject to
a latent fiduciary duty of loyalty might lead a casual observer to conclude the
natural result will be an explosion of litigation. This is not the case. The
practical scope of loyalty duties can and should be contained, and litigation
should be confined to cases presenting real and serious conflicts of interest,
through several restrictive measures. One of the most important is to allow
shareholders accused of breaching their duty of loyalty to use the procedural
rules and affirmative legal defenses employed in cases involving officers and
directors accused of breaching loyalty duties. These procedures and defenses
have proven effective at discouraging frivolous litigation in that context, and
there is no readily apparent reason to believe that they would not be similarly
effective at protecting shareholder defendants from frivolous litigation as well.
One such protection is the plaintiffs burden of alleging facts
demonstrating that the shareholder defendant (1) exercised influence and (2)
had a material economic interest in the outcome that differed from that of other
shareholders. The number of cases in which a plaintiff can make both showings
is likely to be small, and also likely to involve circumstances where judicial
scrutiny is appropriate and desirable. This is because investors generally can
use formal shareholder status to influence corporations in three ways: (1) by
voting; (2) by filing suit against the firm or its managers; and (3) by publicly
seeking to embarrass or threaten incumbent management with a proxy fight or
public relations campaign. Very few shareholders engage in the last two
176. This approach is used perhaps most often in loyalty cases involving allegations of
"taking a corporate opportunity," where disgorgement is a common remedy. See, e.g.,
Hollinger Int'l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1061 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding controlling
shareholder breached loyalty duties to corporation by concealing the fact that a third party
was interested in purchasing a corporate asset and instead arranging the sale of the asset to
another entity he controlled). Similarly, trading on insider information has been held to be a
loyalty violation despite the absence of any obvious harm to the company because the insider
in question used his access to corporate information to his personal benefit. See, e.g.,
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
177. It is important to bear in mind that our proposed loyalty duty does not require a
shareholder that sells its shares at a premium to share that premium with other shareholders.
A shareholder that is selling its shares is not, by that act, trying to use its shareholder status
to exercise power over the firm or its managers, but is engaging in a market transaction with
an unrelated party. There is some suggestion in case law that such a selling shareholder does
have to exercise care in choosing a buyer to purchase control, however. See supra note 26.
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activities, and those that do are exactly the activists on whom it is most
desirable to impose loyalty duties. Of course, all shareholders can vote. This
does not mean that all shareholders are potential defendants in loyalty cases,
however. Only in the relatively rare case where a vote is hotly contested and
the outcome determined by a small margin can a plaintiff allege the outcome
was determined by the vote of a particular minority shareholder who exercised
"adhoc" control.

Even then, litigation cannot be sustained unless the plaintiff can also allege
facts establishing that the minority shareholder in question had a material
personal economic interest in the outcome. This means that the plaintiff must
allege facts supporting a specific conflict of interest of the sort discussed in Part
II.B. Moreover, the conflict must be substantial ("material") and not de
minimis. Only then, and only if the shareholder subject to the conflict exercised
de facto control, can a suit can go forward. It is then that judicial scrutiny is
most needed.
It should be noted that the requirement that the plaintiff allege facts
showing a material benefit not shared by other shareholders presents an
obstacle to the use of shareholder fiduciary duties to address conflicts between
short-term and long-term shareholders. To show that an activist investor was
subject to such a conflict, a plaintiff would have to show that the investor had
either already sold its interest, or intended to sell it in the very near future. The
plaintiff would also have to show that the stock price increase resulting from
the activist's efforts was only temporary, and so did not equally benefit longterm shareholders. We acknowledge that it will be difficult to make such a
showing in most cases, as the temporary nature of the price increase will
become apparent only after some time, and then any decline could be attributed
to other causes. Thus, the expanded shareholder fiduciary duty we propose may
prove more difficult to employ against conflicts of interest due to 178
investors'
differing time horizons than to other shareholder conflicts of interest.
Let us return now to the question of what happens in a situation in which a
plaintiff can indeed demonstrate both exercise of ad hoc control and a material
conflict of interest. Even then, an activist shareholder defendant retains an
important escape route against liability. That escape route is the traditional
defense, available to officers, directors, and controlling shareholders accused of
loyalty breaches, that while the transaction at issue was tainted by self-interest
it was nevertheless intrinsically fair in terms of both price and process. If a
minority shareholder can show that the corporate transaction at issue was
intrinsically fair to the firm and other shareholders, there similarly should be no
liability. It is only if the transaction is unfair-which is again a situation where
liability is appropriate-that the defendant shareholder will be held liable.
Finally, Section 144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 179 provides
178. See supra text accompanying note 140.

179. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2005). There remains a question about whether a
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two additional defenses for corporate officers and directors who enter into
interested transactions. These defenses might be extended to minority
shareholders as well. The first defense, found in Section 144(a)(2), is that an
interested transaction was approved, after full disclosure of the material facts of
the transaction and the conflict of interest involved, by a majority of the firm's
disinterested shareholders. 180 Case law has extended this defense to controlling
shareholders, through the "majority of the minority defense"-that is, the
defense that an interested transaction with the majority shareholder was
approved by a majority of the remaining minority shareholders.' 81 There is no
logical reason not to extend this defense to minority shareholders. For example,
a greenmail payment raising loyalty questions is far less troublesome if
presented to and approved by the informed majority of the shareholders who
did not receive greenmail.
The second procedural defense provided in Section 144(a)(3) is that an
interested transaction was approved by a majority of the corporation's
disinterested directors. 182 While the defense is available to officers and
directors by the terms of the statute, case law has been reluctant to extend it to
controlling shareholders for the obvious reason that it is hard to imagine how
any director can be truly independent of a controlling shareholder that can
easily remove her from the board. As a result, courts have been skeptical of the
notion that "independent" director approval saves a controlling shareholders'
interested
transaction from further judicial scrutiny or even shifts the burden of
83
proof.1
We believe a similar skepticism is called for when the defendant is a
minority activist, although for somewhat different reasons. While an activist
investor cannot easily remove a director, it can threaten to launch a proxy fight
to do so, and can make the directors' life difficult in other ways (e.g., through
184
an embarrassing and sometimes personalized public relations campaign).
Thus, we are disinclined to attach too much importance to the fact that a
greenmail payment, for example, was approved by the company's board (as

finding that a defendant met these procedures insulates that defendant from liability for
breach of the duty of loyalty or simply shifts the burden of proving intrinsic unfairness back
onto the plaintiff. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) (discussing this
question); see also supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
180. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2).
181. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1982) (discussing defenses
as applied to controlling shareholder).
182. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3).
183. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115-18 (Del.
1994) (finding that even independent directors not employed by or otherwise financially
dominated by a controlling shareholder may nevertheless be dominated by that shareholder);
see also Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7 (suggesting that approval of interested transaction
with controlling shareholder by committee of disinterested directors simply helps to meet the
"fair dealing" prong of the substantive fairness test).
184. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 82, at 1029 (describing one such personal attack).
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indeed virtually all greenmail payments are). Nevertheless, for our purposes,
the applicability of this defense to minority shareholders need not be resolved
here but could be worked out by the courts in the context of actual cases,
just as
85
courts are working out its applicability to controlling shareholders.1
IV. OBJECTIONS

Having outlined the nature of the expanded shareholder duties we propose,
we now turn to the primary objections likely to be raised in response to our
proposal. In particular, we anticipate that extending loyalty duties to activist
shareholders may be critiqued as (1) increasing litigation, (2) chilling beneficial
shareholder activism, and (3) being unnecessary in light of the protections
offered by majority shareholder voting.
A. IncreasedLitigation
By its very nature, the idea of expanding shareholder loyalty duties
inevitably raises the possibility of increased litigation. It is important to bear in
mind, however, that the possibility of increased litigation does not alone mean
that expanding duties is undesirable. We should be willing to tolerate the costs
of adding duties if they are offset by greater benefits.
First, as discussed in Part III.B.3, the shareholder duty we propose is
subject to the same procedural and substantive defenses designed to discourage
frivolous and inappropriate litigation as the conventional duty of loyalty
applied to officers, directors, and controlling shareholders. Just as in the case of
conventional loyalty duties, these defenses will help ensure that lawsuits to
enforce minority shareholder loyalty duties are filed both rarely and
appropriately.
Second, it is generally accepted that, when applied to corporate officers
and directors and controlling shareholders, the costs of recognizing and
enforcing loyalty duties in the courts are more than worthwhile, even though
the result is more litigation than if there were no such duties. This is because
loyalty duties are understood to play a valuable role in preventing managers
and controlling shareholders from succumbing to the temptation to enrich
themselves at the firm's and shareholders' expense.
As minority shareholders have begun to acquire the same kind of power to
influence corporate actions, at least with regard to specific issues, the same can
185. We note that judicial unease over allowing approval by independent directors to
cleanse a controlling shareholder transaction is not tantamount to a presumption that such

directors were themselves conflicted with respect to the transaction. Consequently, the
actions of directors and of shareholders in a transaction in which a controlling shareholder
engaged in a conflict-of-interest transaction would likely be reviewed under different
standards. See supra note 63.
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be said of them. Indeed, the case for loyalty duties may be even stronger in this
context. Misbehavior by officers and directors is constrained by other powerful
forces, above and beyond the threat of liability, that do not apply nearly as
strongly to minority shareholders. For example, reputational concerns that
might discourage an executive or board member from entering a blatantly selfinterested transaction are far less likely to dissuade a hedge fund investor. Not
only is a hedge fund manager's reputation unlikely to suffer as a result of
grasping behavior, he may even be rewarded for it by his own investors, who
stand to profit from it. The market for corporate control is similarly unlikely to
deter minority shareholders from behaving opportunistically. Whereas
managers who steal from their firms risk being ousted, activist shareholders
who indulge in self-dealing do not face this risk. Thus, fiduciary duty rules may
be even more important in the shareholder context than they are for managers.
B. ChillingEffects

Many contemporary experts in corporate governance believe that
shareholder oversight plays an important role in controlling managerial
misbehavior. 186 This belief, in turn, has played an important role in bringing
about the reapportionment of influence from managers to shareholders
described in Part II.A. According to this perspective, making firms more
accountable to shareholders improves corporate performance by giving
managers less discretion to pursue goals other than shareholder wealth
maximization.
If this is true, it is reasonable to be concerned that imposing stronger
fiduciary duties on shareholders will interfere with their ability to effectively
monitor managers' behavior. Under current case law, shareholders have wide
latitude to influence corporate policy in any way that they see fit. Imposing
fiduciary duties on activist shareholders creates a risk of liability that may
discourage at least some shareholders from taking an active role in corporate
governance.
Our first response to this concern is that, though plausible, it seems
overstated. Although much has been made of the potential benefits of
shareholder activism, as we have seen, activists often have private interests that
are substantially different from enhancing overall shareholder wealth. Modem
shareholders are characterized by deep and growing rifts, creating an inevitable
risk that shareholders will use their power not to monitor managers for the
greater good but to enrich themselves at others' expense. Greater empirical
research could shed light on how shareholders direct their activism, and more
should be done. Meanwhile, the limited data available is inauspicious. Studies
show that mutual funds and pension funds that employ activist strategies fail to

186. See sources cited supra note 8 (articles on shareholder power).
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produce long-term benefits for shareholders, 187 and while data on hedge funds'
activism is just beginning to appear and be scrutinized, the results are similarly
uninspiring. 188 This is not to say that activism cannot benefit shareholders, only
to suggest that the problem of chilling shareholder activism may not be as stark
as it might at first appear.
Second, our proposed fiduciary duty regime leaves ample room for
unconflicted shareholders to use their power. A pension or mutual fund seeking
to limit executive pay would not be vulnerable to a claim that it had violated its
fiduciary duties to other shareholders because, regardless of whether limiting
executive pay helped or harmed corporate performance, the effects would be
felt equally by the activist and all other shareholders. 1 89 (The situation would
be quite different, of course, if the activist were seeking to limit executive pay
while simultaneously demanding that the corporation hire it as a highly paid
human resources advisor.) Similarly, an unconflicted shareholder activist would
be free to agitate for the corporation to pay higher wages or fight global
warming.190 As discussed in our introduction to Part III, loyalty duties are not
involved when shareholders without an economic conflict of interest disagree
honestly on business strategy or the social purpose of the firm.
Finally, our proposal permits even shareholders with conflicts of interest to
participate in corporate governance, provided they are willing to risk their
conduct being analyzed under the entire fairness standard of review. If they can
demonstrate that their actions do not benefit their private interests to the
detriment or exclusion of other shareholders, they will not be deemed to have
breached their duty. Our proposal thus permits even conflicted shareholders to
take actions they can demonstrate benefit other shareholders.
The end result is that our proposal preserves aspects of "shareholder
democracy" that are unbiased while filtering out the elements of shareholder
activism that are conflicted and that the activist cannot persuade a court (or a
majority of the firm's unconflicted shareholders) are beneficial to the firm. We
187. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance2-3 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 139/2006,
2007), availableat http:/ssrn.com/abstract=948907 (citing studies).
188. See April Klein & Emanuel Zur, EntrepreneurialShareholder Activism: Hedge
Funds and Other Private Investors 21, 44 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Fin.
Working Paper No. 140/2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913362 (finding
that hedge funds "target good-performing firms" and that in the 12 months after the fund
becomes a shareholder, earnings per share and return on assets actually decline); see also
Bratton, supra note 84, at 1422 (concluding that "it is not safe to assume one would beat the
market by investing in a portfolio of hedge fund targets"). But see Bray et al., supra note
187, at 3 (finding that sample of activist funds generated positive abnormal returns, but only
in cases where the activism led to sale of the company or spinning off assets).
189. See Lorraine Woellert & Eamon Javers, Attack of the Shareholders, Bus. WK.,
Mar. 5, 2007, at 9 (describing institutional shareholder efforts to get a say on executive pay).
190. See Shareholder Proposals:ExxonMobil Denied No-Action Relieffor Proposals

Raising Environmental Issues, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 613 (2005) (reporting
shareholder proposal to ExxonMobil regarding company's stance on global warming).
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think this approach is a reasonable way to try to preserve the benefits of greater
shareholder power as a check on managerial misbehavior, while limiting its
potential for abuse.
C. Majority Voting
Yet another objection some might raise to our proposal is that it is simply
unnecessary because non-controlling shareholder overreaching is limited by the
principle of majority rule. According to this argument, minority shareholders
cannot pursue private agendas to the detriment of other shareholders because
they are unable to obtain the support they need to push through their initiatives.
For example, a union pension fund opposing a sale of the company out of fear
it will eliminate jobs will have trouble garnering support from other
shareholders to veto the deal. Only activist initiatives that increase shareholder
value should succeed.
There are a number of difficulties with this argument. Most centrally, it
ignores that fact that the same rational apathy that makes it difficult for public
company shareholders to police managers makes it difficult for them to police
each other. To oppose an overreaching activist, other shareholders must first
know about the overreaching; then, they must be able to take action to prevent
it; and, finally, they must overcome the free-rider problem that tempts each to
sit back and hope another shareholder will do the work.
Each of these requirements is problematic. Activists rarely go out of their
way to publicize their conflicts of interest. To the contrary, they try to obscure
them, and their disclosure obligations are often partial at best.' 9 1 This makes it
difficult for unconflicted shareholders to obtain information about activists'
real motives, even should they be inclined to do so. Second, it can be difficult
even for informed shareholders to prevent an activist from pushing through a
corporate strategy or transaction that does not require a shareholder vote. For
example, activists can apply pressure directly to managers to pursue business
policies that favor their private interests, with other shareholders having no say
in such decisions. Finally, free riding is an endemic problem. Even when a
disinterested shareholder, such as a large mutual fund, holds a large enough
block of shares to make it economically worthwhile to oppose an overreaching
activist, the mutual fund may well decline to do so in the hope another large
mutual fund may step in. None of this is to say that majority rule cannot be a
serious impediment to minority shareholder "rent-seeking." But it is hardly a
panacea. Ample room remains for expanded shareholder fiduciary duties to
curb shareholder self-interested behavior.

191. See, e.g., Briggs, supra note 74, at 703-08 (discussing limited disclosure
obligations of hedge funds).
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CONCLUSION

Greed and selfishness are powerful forces, and they are no less powerful
for shareholders than for corporate officers and directors. 192 Corporate law has
historically relied on the fiduciary duty of loyalty to constrain greed and
selfishness. In the case of officers and directors, these loyalty rules are well
developed and regularly employed. The duty of loyalty has been applied
sparingly to shareholders, however, and then only to controlling shareholders,
primarily in freeze-out mergers and closely held corporations. Minority
investors in public firms are viewed as free agents at liberty to use their
influence as they please, including using it to serve their own personal
economic interests.
This situation has arisen because minority shareholders in public firms
have had, until recently, very little influence to either use or abuse. Moreover, it
has been assumed that minority shareholders are motivated by a common and
benign interest in improving corporate performance. But the corporate
landscape is shifting under our feet. Dramatic changes in the markets, in
business practices and institutions, and in corporate law, have given minority
shareholders in public firms more power to influence corporate policy than they
have ever enjoyed before. Activist investors, especially rapidly growing hedge
funds, have not hesitated to employ this leverage with energy and ingenuity. In
the process, serious schisms in shareholder interests have appeared, with more
faults being revealed daily.
The corporate law rules of fiduciary duty are well suited to address the
problem. This Article demonstrates this by proposing a reinterpretation of
shareholder loyalty rules that treats all shareholders, controlling and minority
alike, as subject to a latent duty of loyalty. That duty would be triggered
whenever a shareholder successfully employs its shareholder status to promote
a corporate action that gives it a personal, material economic benefit to the
detriment or exclusion of other shareholders.
But to say that fiduciary duty law can control the downside of enhanced
shareholder power is not the same thing as saying it is likely to do so. Existing
case law provides a foundation on which courts can build a broader conception
of shareholder duty than currently exists. Unless courts choose to build such a
conception and apply loyalty duties beyond traditional paradigms, the doctrine
of shareholder fiduciary duty will remain largely irrelevant both to the growing
role of activists in corporate governance and to the debate over the wisdom of
increasing shareholder power. We believe this would be an unfortunate waste
of a valuable opportunity. For good or ill, the balance of power between
192. Indeed, they may be more powerful. Social context signals to corporate officers
and directors that they are supposed to behave like selfless fiduciaries, and substantial
evidence indicates that social context changes behavior. See Stout, supra note 18, at 1. Until
courts expand shareholder fiduciary duties as we suggest, present social context encourages
shareholders to act selfishly and opportunistically.
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shareholders and managers in public firms is shifting toward greater
"shareholder democracy." The reconception of shareholder fiduciary duties that
we propose can do much to help ensure that this change is, indeed, a change for
the better.

HeinOnline -- 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1308 2007-2008

